PhilSci Archive

The Problem of Induction and Metaphysical Assumptions Concerning the Comprehensibility and Knowability of the Universe

Maxwell, Nicholas (2007) The Problem of Induction and Metaphysical Assumptions Concerning the Comprehensibility and Knowability of the Universe. In: UNSPECIFIED.

[img] Microsoft Word (.doc)
Induction_and_Metaphysics_LSE_Conference_Paper.doc

Download (265kB)

Abstract

Even though evidence underdetermines theory, often in science one theory only is regarded as acceptable in the light of the evidence. This suggests there are additional unacknowledged assumptions which constrain what theories are to be accepted. In the case of physics, these additional assumptions are metaphysical theses concerning the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe. Rigour demands that these implicit assumptions be made explicit within science, so that they can be critically assessed and, we may hope improved. This leads to a new conception of science, one which we need to adopt in order to solve the problem of induction.


Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Maxwell, Nicholas
Keywords: Induction, metaphysics, physics, explanation, unity, physicalism, comprehensibility of universe
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Theory Change
Specific Sciences > Physics
Depositing User: Nicholas Maxwell
Date Deposited: 21 Jan 2007
Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 15:14
Item ID: 3141
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/3141

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item