Maxwell, Nicholas (2007) The Problem of Induction and Metaphysical Assumptions Concerning the Comprehensibility and Knowability of the Universe. In:  LSE-Pitt Conference: Confirmation, Induction and Science (London, 8 - 10 March, 2007).
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Even though evidence underdetermines theory, often in science one theory only is regarded as acceptable in the light of the evidence. This suggests there are additional unacknowledged assumptions which constrain what theories are to be accepted. In the case of physics, these additional assumptions are metaphysical theses concerning the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe. Rigour demands that these implicit assumptions be made explicit within science, so that they can be critically assessed and, we may hope improved. This leads to a new conception of science, one which we need to adopt in order to solve the problem of induction.
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|Item Type:||Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)|
|Keywords:||Induction, metaphysics, physics, explanation, unity, physicalism, comprehensibility of universe|
|Subjects:||General Issues > Confirmation/Induction|
General Issues > Theory Change
Specific Sciences > Physics
|Conferences and Volumes:|| LSE-Pitt Conference: Confirmation, Induction and Science (London, 8 - 10 March, 2007)|
|Depositing User:||Nicholas Maxwell|
|Date Deposited:||21 Jan 2007|
|Last Modified:||07 Oct 2010 11:14|
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