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Peirce in the long run: remarks on knowledge a ulteriori

Kinouchi, Renato (2007) Peirce in the long run: remarks on knowledge a ulteriori. In: [2007] LSE-Pitt Conference: Confirmation, Induction and Science (London, 8 - 10 March, 2007).

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    Abstract

    Knowledge a priori has an important role in rationalistic schools: it pre-establishes truth in order to justify a system of correlated ideas. Empiricism usually concerns knowledge a posteriori, for experience itself is what we have actually known. Peirce’s probabilistic approach to science was based on necessity in the long run but it has no clear place in the categorization of knowledge either as a priori or as a posteriori. This deficit should be overcome by introducing a new category — synthetic knowledge a ulteriori, defined as what is known about an indefinite number of cases but not about isolated instances.


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    Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
    Keywords: Probability. Induction. Synthetic Judgments. C. S. Peirce.
    Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
    Conferences and Volumes: [2007] LSE-Pitt Conference: Confirmation, Induction and Science (London, 8 - 10 March, 2007)
    Depositing User: Renato Kinouchi
    Date Deposited: 08 Feb 2007
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:14
    Item ID: 3166
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/3166

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