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Material Theory of Induction and Scientific Realism

Saatsi, Juha (2007) Material Theory of Induction and Scientific Realism. In: [2007] LSE-Pitt Conference: Confirmation, Induction and Science (London, 8 - 10 March, 2007).

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    Abstract

    John Norton has advanced a general view of induction---`Material Theory of Induction'---that renders ampliative reasoning in a deep sense local. This paper is a sympathetic appraisal of this view, applying it to the scientific realism debate. It argues that the scientific realist should turn to such local construal of ampliative reasoning in her attempt to justify beliefs about unobservables. More generally, the distinction that Norton draws between `material' and `formal' theories of induction is helpful in contrasting the intuitions behind various realist arguments, and in assessing their strengths and weaknesses. As far as justificatory challenges of induction are concerned, it is in this context that the Material Theory of Induction pays most dividends.


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    Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
    Keywords: Scientific realism; Material induction; Norton
    Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
    General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
    Conferences and Volumes: [2007] LSE-Pitt Conference: Confirmation, Induction and Science (London, 8 - 10 March, 2007)
    Depositing User: Juha Saatsi
    Date Deposited: 27 Feb 2007
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:14
    Item ID: 3191
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/3191

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