PhilSci Archive

No Regrets

Arntzenius, Frank (2007) No Regrets. [Preprint]

This is the latest version of this item.

[img]
Preview
PDF
Download (69Kb) | Preview

    Abstract

    Edith Piaf is famous for her chanson “Non, je ne regrette rien”. I suggest that rational people should not violate Piaf’s ‘No Regrets’ maxim; a rational person should not be able to fore-see that she will regret her decisions. In section 2 I formulate a principle, Desire Reflection, which is a version of Piaf’s maxim. In section 3 I argue that standard evidential decision theory violates this principle. In section 4 I argue that standard causal decison theory does not violate it. In section 5 I discuss whether a couple of variations on these standard decision theories satisfy Desire Reflection. In section 6 I make a suggestion for how causal decision theorists should pick what they consider to be the relevant causal situations. In section 7 I discuss the ‘If you’re so smart, why ain’t cha rich’ objection to causal decision theory, and dismiss it. In section 8 I discuss a more serious problem for causal decision theory, namely ‘Decision Instability’, and argue that it is a real problem. In section 9 I develop deliberational decision theory in order to escape Decision Instability. In section 10 I discuss the connection between deliberational decision theory and game theory. I end with some conclusions.


    Export/Citation:EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
    Social Networking:

    Item Type: Preprint
    Keywords: Decision Theory, Game Theory, Desire Reflection, Decision Instability
    Subjects: General Issues > Decision Theory
    Depositing User: Frank Arntzenius
    Date Deposited: 13 May 2007
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:15
    Item ID: 3342
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/3342

    Available Versions of this Item

    Actions (login required)

    View Item

    Document Downloads