PhilSci Archive

The Third Way on Objective Probability: A Skeptic's Guide to Objective Chance

Hoefer, Carl (2007) The Third Way on Objective Probability: A Skeptic's Guide to Objective Chance. [Preprint]

This is the latest version of this item.

[img]
Preview
PDF
Download (714Kb) | Preview

    Abstract

    The goal of this paper is to sketch and defend a new interpretation or ‘theory’ of objective chance, one that lets us be sure such chances exist and shows how they can play the roles we traditionally grant them. The account is ‘Humean’ in claiming that objective chances supervene on the totality of actual events, but does not imply or presuppose a Humean approach to other metaphysical issues such as laws or causation. Like Lewis (1994) I take the Principal Principle to be the key to understanding objective chance. After describing the main features of Humean objective chance (HOC), I deduce the validity of PP for Humean chances, and end by exploring the limitations of Humean chance.


    Export/Citation:EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
    Social Networking:

    Item Type: Preprint
    Additional Information: Final author's draft, forthcoming in MIND, 2007. This version still has a few very minor errors that will be corrected in the published version.
    Keywords: Probability, Chance, Humeanism, David Lewis, undermining, credence, subjective probability, objective probability, objective chance
    Subjects: Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
    General Issues > Laws of Nature
    General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism
    Depositing User: Carl Hoefer
    Date Deposited: 05 Jul 2007
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:15
    Item ID: 3415
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/3415

    Available Versions of this Item

    Actions (login required)

    View Item

    Document Downloads