PhilSci Archive

Why the Parts of Absolute Space are Immobile

Huggett, Nick (2007) Why the Parts of Absolute Space are Immobile. In: [2007] &HPS1: Integrated History and Philosophy of Science 1.

[img]
Preview
PDF
Download (155Kb) | Preview

    Abstract

    Newton’s arguments for the immobility of the parts of absolute space have been used to licence several proposals concerning his metaphysics. This paper clarifies Newton. Notably, it demonstrates, contrary to Nerlich (2005), that Newton does not appeal to the identity of indiscernibles, but rather to a view about de re representation. Additionally, I show, contrary to DiSalle (1994), that the argument does not reveal Newton to be an anti-substantivalist. Its premises entail that ‘Leibniz shifts’ in space are impossible, but they also entail that all motion is the relative motion of bodies; hence they cannot be core doctrines.


    Export/Citation:EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
    Social Networking:

    Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
    Keywords: Newton, substantivalism, absolute space, space, identity of indiscernibles
    Subjects: Specific Sciences > Physics
    Conferences and Volumes: [2007] &HPS1: Integrated History and Philosophy of Science 1
    Depositing User: Nick Huggett
    Date Deposited: 12 Sep 2007
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:15
    Item ID: 3509
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/3509

    Actions (login required)

    View Item

    Document Downloads