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Scientific Understanding and Synthetic Design

Goodwin, William Mark (2007) Scientific Understanding and Synthetic Design. [Preprint]

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            Abstract

            One of the indisputable signs of the progress made in organic chemistry over the last two hundred years is the increased ability of chemists to manipulate, control and design chemical reactions. The technological expertise manifest in contemporary synthetic organic chemistry is, at least in part, due to developments in the theory of organic chemistry. By appealing to a notable chemist’s attempts to articulate and codify the heuristics of synthetic design, this paper investigates how understanding theoretical organic chemistry facilitates progress in synthetic organic chemistry. The picture that emerges of how the applications of organic chemistry are grounded in its theory is contrasted with both standard and some more contemporary philosophical accounts of the applications of science.


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            Item Type: Preprint
            Additional Information: This article is now available at: “Scientific Understanding and Synthetic Design” in British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60: 271-301, 2009.
            Keywords: organic chemistry, application, technology, synthesis
            Subjects: General Issues > Technology
            General Issues > Structure of Theories
            Specific Sciences > Chemistry
            Depositing User: William Mark Goodwin
            Date Deposited: 29 Oct 2007
            Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:15
            Item ID: 3540
            URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/3540

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