Monton, Bradley (2007) Common-Sense Realism and the Unimaginable Otherness of Science. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Bas van Fraassen endorses both common-sense realism – the view, roughly, that the ordinary macroscopic objects that we take to exist actually do exist – and constructive empiricism – the view, roughly, that the aim of science is truth about the observable world. But what happens if common-sense realism and science come into conflict? I argue that it is reasonable to think that they could come into conflict, by giving some motivation for a mental monist solution to the measurement problem of quantum mechanics. I then consider whether, in a situation where science favors the mental monist interpretation, van Fraassen would want to give up common-sense realism or would want to give up science.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Monton, Bradley
Subjects:	General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
Depositing User:	Bradley Monton
Date Deposited:	13 Nov 2007
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2010 15:15
Item ID:	3650
Subjects:	General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
Date:	November 2007
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/3650

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