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Common-Sense Realism and the Unimaginable Otherness of Science

Monton, Bradley (2007) Common-Sense Realism and the Unimaginable Otherness of Science. [Preprint]

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    Abstract

    Bas van Fraassen endorses both common-sense realism – the view, roughly, that the ordinary macroscopic objects that we take to exist actually do exist – and constructive empiricism – the view, roughly, that the aim of science is truth about the observable world. But what happens if common-sense realism and science come into conflict? I argue that it is reasonable to think that they could come into conflict, by giving some motivation for a mental monist solution to the measurement problem of quantum mechanics. I then consider whether, in a situation where science favors the mental monist interpretation, van Fraassen would want to give up common-sense realism or would want to give up science.


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    Item Type: Preprint
    Subjects: General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
    Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
    Depositing User: Bradley Monton
    Date Deposited: 13 Nov 2007
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:15
    Item ID: 3650
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/3650

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