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Mechanisms, Causes and the Layered Model of the World

Glennan, Stuart (2007) Mechanisms, Causes and the Layered Model of the World. [Preprint]

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    Abstract

    Most philosophical accounts of causation take causal relations to obtain between individuals and events in virtue of nomological relations between properties of these individuals and events. Such views fail to take into account the consequences of the fact that in general the properties of individuals and events will depend upon mechanisms that realize those properties. In this paper I attempt to rectify this failure, and in so doing to provide an account of the causal relevance of higher-level properties. I do this by critiquing one prominent model of higher-level properties – Kim’s functional model of reduction – and contrasting it with a mechanistic approach to higher-level properties and causation.


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    Item Type: Preprint
    Keywords: Causation,Properties,Levels of Organization,Mechanisms
    Subjects: General Issues > Causation
    General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
    General Issues > Explanation
    Depositing User: Stuart Glennan
    Date Deposited: 01 Dec 2007
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:15
    Item ID: 3685
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/3685

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