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Reichenbach's Posits Reposited

Atkinson, David and Peijnenburg, Jeanne (2007) Reichenbach's Posits Reposited. [Preprint]

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    Abstract

    Reichenbach's use of `posits' to defend his frequentistic theory of probability has been criticized on the grounds that it makes unfalsifiable predictions. The justice of this criticism has blinded many to Reichenbach's second use of a posit, one that can fruitfully be applied to current debates within epistemology. We show first that Reichenbach's alternative type of posit creates a difficulty for epistemic foundationalists, and then that its use is equivalent to a particular kind of Jeffrey conditionalization. We conclude that, under particular circumstances, Reichenbach's approach and that of the Bayesians amount to the same thing, thereby presenting us with a new instance in which chance and credence coincide.


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    Item Type: Preprint
    Additional Information: Forthcoming in Erkenntnis
    Keywords: Probability, posits, Reichenbach, Jeffrey.
    Subjects: Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
    General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
    General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
    Depositing User: David Atkinson
    Date Deposited: 23 Dec 2007
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:15
    Item ID: 3722
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/3722

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