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On the distinction between Content Realism and Realism about Intentional States

Kanellou, Aspassia (2008) On the distinction between Content Realism and Realism about Intentional States. In: [2007] EPSA07: 1st Conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association (Madrid, 15-17 November, 2007).

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    Abstract

    In this paper I examine following Jerry Fodor a distinction between Standard Realism about psychological States and intentional or content realism. I try to assess whether Standard Realism and Intentional Realism can satisfy the following two conditions: condition a The content of psychological states can satisfy a type-token distinction. condition b. The content of psychological states is causally relevant to action.


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    Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
    Keywords: language of thought, realism about psychology
    Subjects: General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
    Conferences and Volumes: [2007] EPSA07: 1st Conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association (Madrid, 15-17 November, 2007)
    Depositing User: Aspassia Kanellou
    Date Deposited: 05 Jan 2008
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:16
    Item ID: 3802
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/3802

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