Saunders and Wallace on Everett and Lewis

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Simon Saunders and David Wallace are attempting to use a modified form of David Lewis's analysis of personal fission to support the thought that prior to undergoing Everett branching an informed subject can be uncertain about which outcome s/he will observe. I argue that a central assumption of this seductive idea is questionable despite appearing innocuous and that at the very least further argument is needed in support of it.

Simon Saunders and David Wallace suggest that a subject about to knowingly undergo branching in the Everett multiverse can be understood to be uncertain about what s/he will experience if David Lewis's view of the transtemporal identity of persons through fission is modified (Saunders and Wallace 2007, Wallace 2005a: sec. 3.4, 2005b:14; Lewis 1976). Wallace has what can appear to be an independent argument for pre-measurement uncertainty in making intelligible Hugh Everett III's ‘relative state’ interpretation of quantum mechanics; it is an argument from linguistic interpretative charity. I shall not be challenging that argument here but I shall have something to say about it in relation to the Lewis-based idea. Wallace’s 2005 papers only make brief mention of this idea but it is the focus of attention of Saunders’ and Wallace’s (2007).

Lewis used the world-tube (or ‘worm’) version of transtemporal identity which takes a persisting object to be an aggregate of temporal parts or ‘stages’. For personal identity, the cement which holds the aggregate of person-stages together is an ‘R-relation’ between temporally juxtaposed stages. In a case of genuine personal fission some temporal stage S at time T has multiple successors at a later time T+ which are all R-related to S. Independently of any concern about Everett’s interpretation of quantum mechanics there has been discussion of the possibility of such personal fission in imaginary cases of partial brain transplants and malfunctioning teleporters, dealt with at length by Derek Parfit (1984). Lewis argued that each of these multiple successors can be understood to be a stage of a distinct persisting person who has their origin prior to T and who persists to at least T+. The histories of these distinct persons thus overlap prior to fission. The stage S is a stage of many persons, one for every downstream branch of the ‘world-tree’ of which the pre-fission segment is the trunk.

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Putting this idea into the context of a quantum measurement in Everett’s multiverse where a measurement of the spin of a particle relative to some arbitrarily given spatial direction is made, there are as many observers as there are downstream branches. In realistic Everettian terms that means that there will be a vast and indeterminate number of observers. However, leaving aside very low amplitude branches, the observers will partition post-measurement into a set of observers seeing spin-up and a set of observers seeing spin-down. It will do no harm to simplify this setup for the sake of clarity. So imagine the idealised situation where there is a single fission into two branches with no subsequent branching. What is important here is tracking identity so we can set aside the quantum-mechanical amplitude.

Our observer, Hydra, is attempting to believe the Everett interpretation an is assumed to be fully informed about the relevant aspects of her quantum-mechanical predicament. She has prepared her Stern-Gerlach apparatus at time T for a measurement of the residual x-spin of a silver atom and the result is going to be, according to Everett, that at the later time T+ Hydra will have two ‘successors’ one of whom will see the result UP and the other the result DOWN. On the Lewisian analysis of fission there are in this scenario two observers who we can label HydraUP and HydraDOWN. Following Lewis, these Hydras have distinct stages at T+, where the outcomes UP and DOWN are respectively seen, and common stages up to and including T. Saunders’ and Wallace’s claim is that at T each of the Hydras can truly say ‘I am either HydraUP or HydraDOWN but I do not know which’. Thus each Hydra at T is subject to ignorance about which person she is and this justifies the assertion that each is uncertain about what she is going to see.

The idea can be seductive but we need to think carefully how people are understood to refer to themselves on the world-tube version of transtemporal identity in order to unmask a problem. Firstly, let’s look at what Saunders and Wallace have to say in support of the idea. Here is Wallace:

According to Lewis’s proposal, if at some stage in my future I am to undergo branching into two copies, then (timelessly) there are two people, and my current (pre-branching) person stages are shared by both of them.

On the additional assumption that the correct referent of utterances and of mental states is a person at a time (rather than a person-stage) it follows that I am genuinely ignorant of my post-branching future. For when I say ‘who will I become’ that statement should actually be ascribed to two versions of me (one of whom will, post splitting, become each version of me). Since (as a consequence of any physicalist approach to mind) any thoughts and beliefs I have at a time supervene on my person-stage at that time and since the two versions of me share all person-stages
prior to branching it follows that it is impossible for the two versions of me to resolve their ignorance.

What are they ignorant about? Not of course any propositional knowledge, but something more indexical (2005a, sec. 3.4)

This is much too quick because we need to know more about how an utterance of ‘I’ refers to the utterer for the idea to be coherent, especially as we’re in a novel situation where a single vocal event is to be understood to express the utterances of more than one person. It’s not what Wallace dubs the ‘additional assumption’ that it is persons who utter rather than person-stages which is the problem. It is the lack of any hint of a mechanism whereby each of Wallace’s dual utterers secures an indexical reference to themself by the use of ‘I’ prior to fission. Wallace covers this lacuna by alluding to the ‘ascription’ of each utterance to their respective utterer but, as I shall explain, this idea of ascription trades on a mechanism of indexical reference which is unproblematic in non-branching contexts but which is inapplicable to branching.

Saunders’ and Wallace’s recent paper on the idea attempts to correct this oversight. They make explicit the assumption they need about the reference of utterances of ‘I’:

… one might make a case for a variety of semantic rules, but the one we are interested in is this: *the word ‘I’ refers to the speaker of any sentence in which it occurs.* In the non-branching case, it is a banality. (2007:?? , their emphasis)

Discussion of the status of this assumption is going to be central to the point I have to make against Saunders’ and Wallace’s idea so I shall give the semantic rule a name:

I’s Right: The word ‘I’ refers to the speaker in any sentence in which it occurs.

As I shall show in a moment the adoption of this rule is not actually ‘a banality’ in the non-branching case but even if it were we should surely be suspicious of the assumption that it would be equally banal in the novel metaphysical predicament of Lewisian overlap. Saunders and Wallace are making a strong claim. They are claiming that they can explain how a subject believing Everett can be ignorant of the outcome of a quantum measurement such as Hydra’s prior to making it. Such a claim ought not to rest on applying what appears to be an obvious truism to a novel situation without further ado.
I's Right is not banal in the non-branching case when the world-tube metaphysics of transtemporal identity is adopted for the following reason. On the ‘endurance’ view of transtemporal identity a persisting object is ‘wholly present’ at all times in its history. The world-tube view denies this, taking a persisting object to be its history, an aggregate of temporal parts. On the endurance view a subject is wholly present at any time at which s/he makes an indexical reference, as is any environmental object to which s/he refers. As both referer and referent are wholly present at the time the reference is made there seems to be no problem in principle about there being an indexical relation between them at that time. In contrast, on the world-tube view it is only temporal parts of the referer and the referent which are present at the time the reference is made.

There is no real difficulty for the world-tube theorist here, an account is readily available, but when that account is given it becomes clear that it only applies to non-branching cases. It cannot be applied to branching cases. To see why, consider this. An utterance is made at a time by a person and the utterance is tokened by an event, usually vocal, which is associated with a stage which is a temporal part of that person’s body according to world-tube theory. Suppose that in a non-branching context René, faced with an apple, says ‘That apple is green’ at time T. At time T a temporal stage of René’s body is associated with a vocal event which is understood to be a token of ‘That apple is green’. At time T there is an apple-stage which is appropriately related to the body-stage associated with the vocal event and that apple-stage is a temporal part of a single apple. That’s how René succeeds in indexically referring to an apple: there is an appropriate juxtaposition of the utterance token associated with a stage of René’s body and a stage of the indicated apple. The idea brings to mind the image of a chromosome pair, touching in the middle: the world-tube subject successfully refers to a world-tube object at a time because stages of each world-tube are in an appropriate relation to each other at that time.

Now go on to the non-branching case where René says ‘This is my body’, an unusual statement, but we would generally take it to be perfectly intelligible. He might stab a finger at his chest for gestural emphasis but that would be strictly unnecessary, René’s use of ‘this’ would be enough to indicate the body in question. That is because the site of the token of ‘this’ is a body-stage which is a stage of a unique world-tube body. Like René’s reference to the apple, his reference to his body picks out a unique world-tube referent. But what of René’s reference to himself? Here again the reference has to go via his body, there is nothing else which can provide evidence of which person René is, as is illustrated by everyday expressions such as ‘I’m over here!’.

For René’s utterance of ‘This is my body’ to be true the body picked out by his use of ‘this’ has to be the body belonging to the person who is making the whole utterance. Clearly, the body-stage which is the site of the whole utterance is the very same as, or at least contains, the body-stage which is the site of the utterance of ‘this’ and, thanks to the non-branching context, that body-stage is part of a unique body of one person, René.
However, things do not go so smoothly for Lewis’s world-tube view of personal identity in branching contexts. To spell out why, let us return to the case of the Hydras. According to the Saunders/Wallace proposal both HydraUP and HydraDOWN at time T, prior to fission, can truly say ‘I am either HydraUP or HydraDOWN but I don't know which’. Both the Hydras say this severally at the same time since a single utterance token tokens two utterances, one made by HydraUP and the other made by HydraDOWN. Saunders and Wallace require that the Hydras are able to use ‘I’ in the everyday way in which we understand it, so that HydraUP refers to HydraUP when she uses ‘I’ and HydraDOWN’s ‘I’ refers to HydraDOWN. That must imply that both the Hydras can successfully indexically refer to their own bodies, since, as we saw with René, bodies are all we have to go on in determining which utterance of ‘I’ refers to which person.

But HydraUP and HydraDOWN cannot each indexically refer to her own body via an utterance of ‘This is my body’ which has a single token sited in a single body-stage at time T prior to branching. Because that single body-stage is common to the world-tube bodies of both HydraUP and HydraDOWN. Why should the ‘this’ in HydraUP’s utterance of ‘This is my body’ be understood to refer to HydraUP’s body rather than to HydraDOWN’s? There is no reason. And if neither of the Hydras can secure reference to their own bodies then neither can secure reference to herself via an utterance of ‘I’.

Further elaboration of Saunders’ and Wallace’s idea may help to make this point clearer. According to them the Hydra setup involves two apparatuses. Prior to branching those two apparatuses share temporal stages. So prior to measurement HydraUP sees ApparatusUP, the apparatus which is going to display the result UP, and HydraDOWN sees ApparatusDOWN. But not everthing in the Hydras’ pre-measurement environment inhabits the proposed two worlds. Events and temporal stages of sufficiently short duration are common to both worlds. Thus if HydraUP and HydraDOWN see a lightening flash outside their respective laboratory windows prior to measurement then they both refer to one and the same lightening flash even though they each refer, supposedly, to numerically distinct apparatuses and windows.

An utterance of ‘I’ is not an instantaneous event but it is an episode of sufficiently short duration not to be involved in branching in the case before us. And as I explained above we would ordinarily take an utterance of ‘I’ to refer to the utterer by way of being associated with the simultaneous body-stage of the person making the utterance if we adopt the world-tube metaphysics of transtemporal identity. But any supposed separate simultaneous utterances of ‘I’ prior to measurement made buy HydraUP and HydraDOWN are associated with one and the same body-stage simultaneous with those utterances, just as there is one and the same lightening flash outside their respective windows. And that one body-stage is common to the bodies of both HydraUP and HydraDOWN. So again we see that there is no mechanism whereby HydraUP and HydraDOWN can refer unambiguously to their own bodies prior to measurement.
What is emerging here is that an utterance of ‘I’ in Lewisian contexts of multiple utterance cannot straightforwardly be assumed to refer to the utterer. The semantic rule I’s Right cannot be adopted without further ado. It would not be good enough to say that this points to exactly the ignorance for which Saunders and Wallace want to argue because the breakdown of indexical reference which I have described simply makes the Hydras’ pre-measurement statements of ‘I am either HydraUP or HydraDOWN but I don’t know which’ unintelligible. Such an utterance would be as unintelligible as an utterance of ‘That is green’ in a context lacking any basis for a mechanism whereby the use of ‘that’ involved an indexical reference to a specific object.

The objection to Saunders’ and Wallace’s idea, then, is that it requires the semantic rule I’s right which makes a claim about reference but no account of how that reference is secured is given even though we would expect such an account in non-branching contexts. Is it reasonable that the authors should simply insist that HydraUP and HydraDOWN can each successfully refer to hereself in the novel context of Lewisian overlap and not give any explanation of how this is possible? There may be a hint of recognition of the need for such an explanation when Saunders and Wallace write:

Is it to be objected that thoughts or utterances have an irreducibly local significance? We may grant the point that their tokenings are purely local events - and as such, indeed, are identical - but the content of thoughts and utterances is another question. On even the most timid forms of externalism, or functionalism for that matter, meanings are context-dependent. The sentences produced pre-branching are likely to play different semantic roles for each person subsequently, and likewise their component terms.

This point suggests wide lattitude when it comes to the context-dependence of personal pronouns. (2007 :??)

The suggestion here would seem to be that HydraUP’s and HydraDOWN’s separate simultaneous utterances of ‘I’ can each be understood to refer to the ascribed speaker in virtue of the ‘context’ in which they are uttered, where that context is taken to include the whole histories of the Hydras’ bodies. But the appeal to semantic externalism which is being made to support this needs more explanation. For one thing, any semantic dependence is not normally understood to extend into an utterance’s future, semantic externalism as it is is generally understood to involve a creature’s past history and environment. For another, even such an ardent fan of semantic externalism as Tyler Burge has influentially argued that the content of indexical terms is not externally determined (1982 :98).
As a fall-back, might Wallace wish to appeal to his linguistic argument for charitable interpretation in order to justify the adoption of I’s Right? The argument could be that if we in fact inhabit an Everettian multiverse then all utterances of ‘I’ would fail to refer to the utterer on a world-tube view of personal identity and so we had better, out of linguistic charity, allow that they do so refer. But this would be to neglect that the world-tube view is not the only interpretation of transtemporal identity which can cope with branching. Since 1996 there has become available Ted Sider’s ‘stage theory’ which can embrace the idea of continuant identity through branching without involving the concept of multiple utterance (Sider, 1996, 2001). According to stage theory persons are stages, not aggregates of stages, and so any utterance at a time has a token which is associated with the unique body, itself a stage, which is the body of that person at that time. Thus even if we do inhabit an Everettian multiverse utterances of ‘I’ can be understood to indexically refer to the utterer by the straightforward indexical mechanism of a token of a single utterance being appropriately associated with the body of a single person.

For readers not familiar with it, here is Sider’s idea, which was not itself motivated by concerns about branching. Sider adapted Lewis’s concept of modal counterparts to introduce the idea of temporal counterparts. According to Lewis I have modal counterparts who are persons with blond hair in various ‘possible worlds’. For any one of those modal counterparts I am not that person but I bear the relation MIGHT HAVE BEEN to that person. According to Sider I have past temporal counterparts who scrump ed apples. For any one of those past temporal counterparts I am not that person but I bear the relation WAS to that person. If I am about to make a spin measurement in the Everett multiverse in the manner of Hydra then, according to Sider, I have future counterparts who see UP and future counterparts who see DOWN. For any one of those future counterparts I am not that person but I bear the relation WILL BE to that person, so I will be a person seeing UP and I will be a person seeing DOWN whilst those future counterparts of mine are simultaneously distinct persons (Sider, 2001 : 201).

Saunders and Wallace might wish to argue that Siderian transtemporal identity is not suitable if we inhabit an Everettian multiverse, that we are forced to accept Lewisian identity and that therefore, out of linguistic charity, we should generally interpret utterances of ‘I’ to refer to the utterer even though those utterances would be multiple in Lewis’s sense. That would be a substantive argument which would need to be brought into play to support Saunders’ and Wallace’s proposal that a modified Lewisian semantics can motivate the idea of uncertainty of outcome prior to branching. Furthermore, it would imply that there is a more intimate connection between the metaphysics of identity and the argument from linguistic charity than Wallace appears to recognise in his writings to date.
In sum, the idea that Lewis’s analysis of personal fission can be used to ground a notion of ignorance-based uncertainty prior to Everett branching appears to be inadequate unless it can be backed up by more extensive arguments than have been given so far. So Saunders’ and Wallace’s claim to have solved the ‘incoherence problem’ of the Everett interpretation is premature. They state the incoherence problem as being the idea that the Everett interpretation ‘can make no sense of talk of uncertainty’ (2007:??). Bear in mind that Saunders and Wallace (2007) is concerned with establishing pre-measurement uncertainty and that it may be that the Everett interpretation can be rendered intelligible by appeal to a concept of post-measurement uncertainty such as Lev Vaidman’s (1998). Wallace himself acknowledges such a possibility (2005a, sec. 4.2).

References


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