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Intrinsic Explanation and Field's Dispensabilist Strategy

Marcus, Russell (2007) Intrinsic Explanation and Field's Dispensabilist Strategy. In: [2008] Reduction and the Special Sciences (Tilburg, April 10-12, 2008).

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    Abstract

    Philosophy of mathematics for the last half-century has been dominated in one way or another by Quine’s indispensability argument. The argument alleges that our best scientific theory quantifies over, and thus commits us to, mathematical objects. In this paper, I present new considerations which undermine the most serious challenge to Quine’s argument, Hartry Field’s reformulation of Newtonian Gravitational Theory.


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    Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
    Keywords: Field Indispensability Intrinsic Explanation Quine
    Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics
    General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
    General Issues > Explanation
    Conferences and Volumes: [2008] Reduction and the Special Sciences (Tilburg, April 10-12, 2008)
    Depositing User: Russell Marcus
    Date Deposited: 14 Feb 2008
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:16
    Item ID: 3891
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/3891

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