Tappenden, Paul (2008) Identity and uncertainty in Everett's multiverse. [Preprint]

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Abstract

In the current debate on the concept of probability in the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics Saunders and Wallace argue for a notion of pre-measurement uncertainty whilst Greaves and Myrvold attempt to do without uncertainty altogether. Both these approaches are controversial and I suggest a middle way. I develop in detail an argument which Wallace has hinted at and Greaves has seen as beside the point in order to show that Vaidman’s concept of post-measurement uncertainty has more relevance to pre-measurement decision making than has hitherto been generally recognised. Further, Vaidman uncertainty leads naturally to another form of post-measurement uncertainty which clarifies the process of experimental confirmation of quantum mechanics in the Everett picture. I also stress the importance of Sider’s theory of transtemporal identity in making Everett’s multiverse intelligible.

Available Versions of this Item

• Identity and uncertainty in Everett's multiverse. (deposited 18 Feb 2008)[Currently Displayed]
  • Evidence and Uncertainty in Everett's Multiverse. (deposited 16 Dec 2009)

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