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On the non-elimination of mental states by adopting a ruthless-reductive stance

Fonseca, João (2008) On the non-elimination of mental states by adopting a ruthless-reductive stance. In: [2008] Reduction and the Special Sciences (Tilburg, April 10-12, 2008).

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    Abstract

    In several places, John Bickle claims that current neuroscientific practice provides actual cellular/molecular reductions of certain mental states. He gives the case study of ‘memory consolidation switch’ as an example where recent findings suggest that this mental state/process can be reduced to the molecular ‘cAMP, PKA, CREB Pathway’. Taking this example, Bickle ‘waves the eleminativist flag’ by claiming that psychological explanations loose their pertinence (or, as he says, ‘became otiose’) once a cellular/molecular explanation replaces them. On this paper I’ll try to show that, even if a reductive explanation of ‘memory consolidation switch’ is disposable, we cannot eschew reductively its causal/functional integrity, i.e.: the explanatory/causal context that defines the mental concept/process ‘memory consolidation switch’ in the first place.


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    Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
    Subjects: General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
    Conferences and Volumes: [2008] Reduction and the Special Sciences (Tilburg, April 10-12, 2008)
    Depositing User: Justin Sytsma
    Date Deposited: 05 Mar 2008
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:16
    Item ID: 3924
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/3924

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