Dietrich, Franz (2008) The premises of Condorcet's jury theorem are not simultaneously justified. UNSPECIFIED.
Condorcet's famous jury theorem reaches an optimistic conclusion on the correctness of majority decisions, based on two controversial premises about voters: they should be competent and vote independently, in a technical sense. I carefully analyse these premises and show that: (i) whether a premise is justified depends on the notion of uncertainty or probability employed; (ii) no such notion renders both premises simultaneously justified. Especially the independence assumption should be weakened.
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|Keywords:||Condorcet jury theorem, probability, social choice theory, epistemic democracy, social epistemology, common cause, causal network|
|Subjects:||Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
General Issues > Decision Theory
General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Causation
Specific Sciences > Economics
|Depositing User:||Franz Dietrich|
|Date Deposited:||13 Mar 2008|
|Last Modified:||07 Oct 2010 15:16|
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