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The premises of Condorcet's jury theorem are not simultaneously justified

Dietrich, Franz (2008) The premises of Condorcet's jury theorem are not simultaneously justified. UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

Condorcet's famous jury theorem reaches an optimistic conclusion on the correctness of majority decisions, based on two controversial premises about voters: they should be competent and vote independently, in a technical sense. I carefully analyse these premises and show that: (i) whether a premise is justified depends on the notion of uncertainty or probability employed; (ii) no such notion renders both premises simultaneously justified. Especially the independence assumption should be weakened.


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Item Type: Other
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Dietrich, Franz
Keywords: Condorcet jury theorem, probability, social choice theory, epistemic democracy, social epistemology, common cause, causal network
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
General Issues > Decision Theory
General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Causation
Specific Sciences > Economics
Depositing User: Franz Dietrich
Date Deposited: 13 Mar 2008
Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 15:16
Item ID: 3939
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/3939

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