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The premises of Condorcet's jury theorem are not simultaneously justified

Dietrich, Franz (2008) The premises of Condorcet's jury theorem are not simultaneously justified. UNSPECIFIED.

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    Abstract

    Condorcet's famous jury theorem reaches an optimistic conclusion on the correctness of majority decisions, based on two controversial premises about voters: they should be competent and vote independently, in a technical sense. I carefully analyse these premises and show that: (i) whether a premise is justified depends on the notion of uncertainty or probability employed; (ii) no such notion renders both premises simultaneously justified. Especially the independence assumption should be weakened.

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    Item Type: Other
    Keywords: Condorcet jury theorem, probability, social choice theory, epistemic democracy, social epistemology, common cause, causal network
    Subjects: Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
    General Issues > Decision Theory
    General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
    General Issues > Causation
    Specific Sciences > Economics
    Depositing User: Franz Dietrich
    Date Deposited: 13 Mar 2008
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:16
    Item ID: 3939
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/3939

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