Dietrich, Franz (2008) The premises of Condorcet's jury theorem are not simultaneously justified. UNSPECIFIED.
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Condorcet's famous jury theorem reaches an optimistic conclusion on the correctness of majority decisions, based on two controversial premises about voters: they should be competent and vote independently, in a technical sense. I carefully analyse these premises and show that: (i) whether a premise is justified depends on the notion of uncertainty or probability employed; (ii) no such notion renders both premises simultaneously justified. Especially the independence assumption should be weakened.
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|Keywords:||Condorcet jury theorem, probability, social choice theory, epistemic democracy, social epistemology, common cause, causal network|
|Subjects:||Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics|
General Issues > Decision Theory
General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Causation
Specific Sciences > Economics
|Depositing User:||Franz Dietrich|
|Date Deposited:||13 Mar 2008|
|Last Modified:||07 Oct 2010 11:16|
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