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Can Rationalist Abductivism Solve the Problem of Induction?

Beebe, James (2008) Can Rationalist Abductivism Solve the Problem of Induction? [Preprint]

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    Abstract

    According to Laurence BonJour, the problem of induction can be solved by recognizing the a priori necessity that inductive conclusions constitute the best explanations of inductive premises. I defend an interpretation of the key probability claims BonJour makes about inductive premises and show that they are not susceptible to many of the objections that have been lodged against them. I then argue that these purportedly necessary probability claims nevertheless remain deeply problematic and that, as a result, BonJour's proposal fails to provide a satisfactory resolution of the problem of induction.


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    Item Type: Preprint
    Keywords: problem of induction, rationalism, abductivism
    Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
    Depositing User: James Beebe
    Date Deposited: 28 Mar 2008
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:16
    Item ID: 3961
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/3961

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