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Evolutionary Psychology and the Problem of Neural Plasticity

Ward, Chuck (2008) Evolutionary Psychology and the Problem of Neural Plasticity. In: [2008] Biological Explanations of Behavior: Philosophical Perspectives (Hannover, Germany; 12-15 June, 2008).

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    Abstract

    Evolutionary psychology as commonly presented is committed to the view that our cognitive architecture consists of a set of genetically pre-specified, domain specific, computational modules that are adaptations to the environment of our Pleistocene ancestors. These commitments yield a picture in which the underlying computational design of the human mind is genetically transmitted while cultural variation results from differential experiential inputs being processed through this common architecture. This view has been criticized from a developmental point of view. This paper develops some of those criticisms specifically as they relate to the plasticity of neural structures and their responsiveness to social interactions. In best case scenarios the confirmation of adaptive explanations involves identifying the specific causal mechanisms of selection. This is illustrated in examples from ecological genetics. This is not possible in the case of evolutionary psychology. Instead claims that certain computational modules evolved as adaptations in the ancestral environment are supported by their cross-cultural occurrence in modern populations. However, evidence suggests that behavior itself, and cultural practices, are factors that influence the development of neural structures and the cognitive processes they instantiate. So while genes are playing a role in the development of the brain, they do not really encode its neural architecture. When selection favors one set of neural characteristics over alternatives, the genes that played a role in the development of those structures are passed on. But this does not guarantee replication of the structures themselves. What is being selected? Not genes, but organisms with certain neurological and behavioral tendencies in particular environments. Variation in the genetic determinants of neurological structure is not a necessary condition for natural selection to act on behavior. The necessary condition, as Darwin originally put the point, is that traits are heritable. Certainly heritability implies some genetic transmission between generations. But heritability of neural structure requires more than a genetic determinant because neural structures are so plastic. Some regulation of the experiential environment in which those genes act is also necessary. This suggests that an adequate account of the evolution of behavior requires a multi-level approach that recognizes that gene action and social behavior are related by a kind of causal reciprocity. Such an account would be quite different than the evolutionary psychologists’ model of culture being layered over the top of an underlying cognitive computer that is genetically propagated.


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    Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
    Keywords: Neural Plasticity, Evolutionary Psychology, Developmental Systems Theory
    Subjects: Specific Sciences > Biology > Neuroscience
    Specific Sciences > Biology > Developmental Biology
    Specific Sciences > Biology > Evolutionary Psychology
    Conferences and Volumes: [2008] Biological Explanations of Behavior: Philosophical Perspectives (Hannover, Germany; 12-15 June, 2008)
    Depositing User: Chuck Ward
    Date Deposited: 31 May 2008
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:16
    Item ID: 4048
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/4048

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