PhilSci Archive

Local Causality and Completeness: Bell vs. Jarrett

Norsen, Travis (2008) Local Causality and Completeness: Bell vs. Jarrett. [Preprint]

[img]
Preview
PDF
Download (201Kb) | Preview

    Abstract

    J.S. Bell believed that his famous theorem entailed a deep and troubling conflict between the empirically verified predictions of quantum theory and the notion of local causality that is motivated by relativity theory. Yet many physicists continue to accept, usually on the reports of textbook writers and other commentators, that Bell's own view was wrong, and that, in fact, the theorem only brings out a conflict with determinism or the hidden-variables program or realism or some other such principle that (unlike local causality), allegedly, nobody should have believed anyway. (Moreover, typically such beliefs arise without the person in question even being aware that the view they are accepting differs so radically from Bell's own.) Here we try to shed some light on the situation by focusing on the concept of local causality that is the heart of Bell's theorem, and, in particular, by contrasting Bell's own understanding with the analysis of Jon Jarrett which has been the most influential source, in recent decades, for the kinds of claims mentioned previously. We point out a crucial difference between Jarrett's and Bell's own understanding of Bell's formulation of local causality, which turns out to be the basis for the erroneous claim, made by Jarrett and many others, that Bell misunderstood the implications of his own theorem.


    Export/Citation:EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
    Social Networking:

    Item Type: Preprint
    Keywords: Quantum Theory, Bell's Theorem, Non-Locality, Completeness, EPR
    Subjects: Specific Sciences > Physics > Relativity Theory
    Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
    Depositing User: Travis Norsen
    Date Deposited: 19 Aug 2008
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:16
    Item ID: 4163
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/4163

    Actions (login required)

    View Item

    Document Downloads