Van Dyck, Maarten (2008) Dynamics of Reason and the Kantian Project. In: UNSPECIFIED.
I show why Michael Friedman’s idea that we should view new constitutive frameworks introduced in paradigm-change as members of a convergent series, introduces an uncomfortable tension in his views. It cannot be justified on realist grounds, as this would compromise his Kantian perspective, but his own appeal to a Kantian regulative ideal of reason cannot do the job either. I then explain how to make better sense of the rationality of paradigm-change on what I take to Friedman’s own terms.
|Export/Citation:||EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL|
|Item Type:||Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)|
|Keywords:||Friedman Kant convergence|
|Subjects:||General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Theory Change
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
|Depositing User:||Maarten Van Dyck|
|Date Deposited:||13 Nov 2008|
|Last Modified:||07 Oct 2010 15:17|
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