Van Dyck, Maarten (2008) Dynamics of Reason and the Kantian Project. In: [2008] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 21st Biennial Mtg (Pittsburgh, PA) > PSA 2008 Contributed Papers.
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Abstract
I show why Michael Friedman’s idea that we should view new constitutive frameworks introduced in paradigm-change as members of a convergent series, introduces an uncomfortable tension in his views. It cannot be justified on realist grounds, as this would compromise his Kantian perspective, but his own appeal to a Kantian regulative ideal of reason cannot do the job either. I then explain how to make better sense of the rationality of paradigm-change on what I take to Friedman’s own terms.
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| Item Type: | Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED) |
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| Keywords: | Friedman Kant convergence |
| Subjects: | General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Theory Change General Issues > Philosophers of Science General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism |
| Conferences and Volumes: | [2008] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 21st Biennial Mtg (Pittsburgh, PA) > PSA 2008 Contributed Papers |
| Depositing User: | Maarten Van Dyck |
| Date Deposited: | 13 Nov 2008 |
| Last Modified: | 07 Oct 2010 11:17 |
| Item ID: | 4332 |
| URI: | http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/4332 |
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