Sytsma, Justin (2009) Phenomenological Obviousness and the New Science of Consciousness. In: UNSPECIFIED.
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Is phenomenal consciousness a problem for the brain sciences? An increasing number of researchers not only hold that it is, but that its very existence is a deep mystery. That this problematic phenomenon exists is generally taken for granted: It is asserted that phenomenal consciousness is just phenomenologically obvious. In contrast, I hold that there is no such phenomenon and, thus, that it does not pose a problem for the brain sciences. For this denial to be plausible, however, I need to show that phenomenal consciousness is not phenomenologically obvious. That is the goal of this article.
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|Item Type:||Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)|
|Subjects:||Specific Sciences > Biology > Neuroscience
Specific Sciences > Psychology/Psychiatry
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
|Depositing User:||Justin Sytsma|
|Date Deposited:||29 Jan 2009|
|Last Modified:||07 Oct 2010 15:17|
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Is phenomenal consciousness a problem for the brain sciences? (deposited 04 Nov 2008)
- Phenomenological Obviousness and the New Science of Consciousness. (deposited 29 Jan 2009) [Currently Displayed]
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