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Embodied Delusions and Intentionality

Sheredos, Benjamin (2009) Embodied Delusions and Intentionality. In: [2009] Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 101st Annual Meeting (Savannah, GA April 9-11).

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    Abstract

    Derek Bolton has claimed that extant philosophical theories of mind imply accounts of mental disorder, via their accounts of intentionality. The purpose of this paper is to extend Bolton’s claims, by exploring what an embodied/situated theory of mind might imply about mental disorder. I argue that, unlike the more traditional views Bolton considers, embodied/situated accounts can (in principle) provide an observer-independent criterion for distinguishing mental health from disorder in cases of Capgras and Cotard delusions.

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    Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
    Keywords: phenomenology, intentionality, capgras delusions, cotard delusions, affective feelings, bodily feelings, feelings of familiarity
    Subjects: Specific Sciences > Psychology/Psychiatry
    General Issues > Science and Society
    General Issues > Values In Science
    Conferences and Volumes: [2009] Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 101st Annual Meeting (Savannah, GA April 9-11)
    Depositing User: Benjamin Sheredos
    Date Deposited: 18 Mar 2009
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:17
    Item ID: 4525
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/4525

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