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Embodied Delusions and Intentionality

Sheredos, Benjamin (2009) Embodied Delusions and Intentionality. In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Derek Bolton has claimed that extant philosophical theories of mind imply accounts of mental disorder, via their accounts of intentionality. The purpose of this paper is to extend Bolton’s claims, by exploring what an embodied/situated theory of mind might imply about mental disorder. I argue that, unlike the more traditional views Bolton considers, embodied/situated accounts can (in principle) provide an observer-independent criterion for distinguishing mental health from disorder in cases of Capgras and Cotard delusions.

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Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Sheredos, Benjamin
Additional Information: Corrected Section #'s from the earlier version.
Keywords: phenomenology, intentionality, capgras delusions, cotard delusions, affective feelings, bodily feelings, feelings of familiarity
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Psychology/Psychiatry
General Issues > Science and Society
General Issues > Values In Science
Depositing User: Benjamin Sheredos
Date Deposited: 23 Mar 2009
Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 15:17
Item ID: 4530

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