Sheredos, Benjamin (2009) Embodied Delusions and Intentionality. In:  Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 101st Annual Meeting (Savannah, GA April 9-11).
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Derek Bolton has claimed that extant philosophical theories of mind imply accounts of mental disorder, via their accounts of intentionality. The purpose of this paper is to extend Bolton’s claims, by exploring what an embodied/situated theory of mind might imply about mental disorder. I argue that, unlike the more traditional views Bolton considers, embodied/situated accounts can (in principle) provide an observer-independent criterion for distinguishing mental health from disorder in cases of Capgras and Cotard delusions.
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|Item Type:||Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)|
|Additional Information:||Corrected Section #'s from the earlier version.|
|Keywords:||phenomenology, intentionality, capgras delusions, cotard delusions, affective feelings, bodily feelings, feelings of familiarity|
|Subjects:||Specific Sciences > Psychology/Psychiatry|
General Issues > Science and Society
General Issues > Values In Science
|Conferences and Volumes:|| Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 101st Annual Meeting (Savannah, GA April 9-11)|
|Depositing User:||Benjamin Sheredos|
|Date Deposited:||23 Mar 2009|
|Last Modified:||07 Oct 2010 11:17|
Available Versions of this Item
- Embodied Delusions and Intentionality. (deposited 18 Mar 2009)
- Embodied Delusions and Intentionality. (deposited 23 Mar 2009)[Currently Displayed]
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