Worrall, John (2009) Underdetermination, Realism and Empirical Equivalence. In: UNSPECIFIED.

Preview

PDF Worrall_-_Underdetermination.pdf Download (141kB)

Abstract

Are theories ‘underdetermined by the evidence’ in any way that should worry the scientific realist? I argue that no convincing reason has been given for thinking so. A crucial distinction is drawn between data equivalence and empirical equivalence. Duhem showed that it is always possible to produce a data equivalent rival to any accepted scientific theory. But there is no reason to regard such a rival as equally well empirically supported and hence no threat to realism. Two theories are empirically equivalent if they share all consequences expressed in purely observational vocabulary. This is a much stronger requirement than has hitherto been recognised – two such ‘rival’ theories must in fact agree on many claims that are clearly theoretical in nature. Given this, it is unclear how much of an impact on realism a demonstration that there is always an empirically equivalent ‘rival’ to any accepted theory would have – even if such a demonstration could be produced. Certainly in the case of the version of realism that I defend – structural realism – such a demonstration would have precisely no impact: two empirically equivalent theories are, according to structural realism, cognitively indistinguishable.

---

Export/Citation:

EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL

Social Networking:

Share |

---

Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Worrall, John
Keywords:	underdetermination, empirical equivalence, data equivalence, structural realism.
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Theory Change General Issues > Theory/Observation General Issues > History of Science Case Studies General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User:	Dr Ioannis Votsis
Date Deposited:	28 May 2009
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2010 15:18
Item ID:	4664
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Theory Change General Issues > Theory/Observation General Issues > History of Science Case Studies General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date:	2009
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/4664

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item