Worrall, John (2009) Underdetermination, Realism and Empirical Equivalence. In: UNSPECIFIED.
Are theories ‘underdetermined by the evidence’ in any way that should worry the scientific realist? I argue that no convincing reason has been given for thinking so. A crucial distinction is drawn between data equivalence and empirical equivalence. Duhem showed that it is always possible to produce a data equivalent rival to any accepted scientific theory. But there is no reason to regard such a rival as equally well empirically supported and hence no threat to realism. Two theories are empirically equivalent if they share all consequences expressed in purely observational vocabulary. This is a much stronger requirement than has hitherto been recognised – two such ‘rival’ theories must in fact agree on many claims that are clearly theoretical in nature. Given this, it is unclear how much of an impact on realism a demonstration that there is always an empirically equivalent ‘rival’ to any accepted theory would have – even if such a demonstration could be produced. Certainly in the case of the version of realism that I defend – structural realism – such a demonstration would have precisely no impact: two empirically equivalent theories are, according to structural realism, cognitively indistinguishable.
|Export/Citation:||EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL|
|Item Type:||Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)|
|Keywords:||underdetermination, empirical equivalence, data equivalence, structural realism.|
|Subjects:||General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Theory Change
General Issues > Theory/Observation
General Issues > History of Science Case Studies
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
|Depositing User:||Ioannis Votsis|
|Date Deposited:||28 May 2009|
|Last Modified:||07 Oct 2010 15:18|
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