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Delusions and Dispositional Beliefs

Tumulty, Maura (2009) Delusions and Dispositional Beliefs. In: [2009] Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 35th Annual Meeting (Bloomington, IN; June 12-14).

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    Abstract

    In some ways, someone suffering from the delusion that his or her spouse has been kidnapped and replaced with an imposter appears to believe that he or she eats dinner with an imposter every night. But the imperviousness of delusions to counter-evidence makes it hard to classify them as beliefs, and easier to classify them as imaginings. Bayne and Pacherie want to use Schwitzgebel’s dispositional account of belief to restore confidence in the doxastic character of delusion. While dispositionalism appears to allow us to classify delusions as beliefs, this allowance isn’t a robust vindication of doxasticism. The significance of the allowance can be increased by emphasizing the role of folk-psychological norms in individuating propositional attitudes. But letting those norms play a large role in the individuation of belief makes it hard to count as believers the deluded subjects who violate most such norms. Dispositionalism about belief can’t defend doxasticism about delusion.


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    Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
    Keywords: delusions; dispositions; folk-psychology
    Subjects: Specific Sciences > Psychology/Psychiatry
    Conferences and Volumes: [2009] Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 35th Annual Meeting (Bloomington, IN; June 12-14)
    Depositing User: Maura Tumulty
    Date Deposited: 29 May 2009
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:18
    Item ID: 4669
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/4669

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