PhilSci Archive

Making Contact with Observations

Votsis, Ioannis (2007) Making Contact with Observations. In: [2007] EPSA07: 1st Conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association (Madrid, 15-17 November, 2007).

This is the latest version of this item.

[img]
Preview
 PDF
Download (73Kb) | Preview

    Abstract

    In this paper I argue contrary to Bogen and Woodward that data serve as evidence for theories, not only for phenomena. Bogen and Woodward seem to forget the old Duhemian dictum that ‘theories cannot be tested in isolation’. That is, they seem to forget that theories require the help of auxiliary hypotheses to make contact with data. When augmented with suitable auxiliaries, theories do entail, predict and potentially explain the data. I say ‘potentially explain the data’ because my focus in this paper is only on the inferential and predictive relations between theories, phenomena and data. To demonstrate my claim I examine four cases from physics, chemistry and astronomy: (i) a controversy between Lavoisier and Priestley, (ii) the calculation of lead’s melting point, (iii) the prediction of the Poisson spot and (iv) the discovery of Neptune.

    Export/Citation:EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
    Social Networking:
    Share |
    Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
    Keywords: observation, data, phenomena, evidence, theory, theory-ladenness, novel prediction, Lavoisier, Priestley, melting point of led, Poisson spot, Neptune.
    Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
    General Issues > Structure of Theories
    General Issues > Theory Change
    General Issues > Theory/Observation
    General Issues > History of Science Case Studies
    General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
    Conferences and Volumes: [2007] EPSA07: 1st Conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association (Madrid, 15-17 November, 2007)
    Depositing User: Ioannis Votsis
    Date Deposited: 01 Jun 2009
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:18
    Item ID: 4672
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/4672

    Available Versions of this Item

    Actions (login required)

    		 View Item

    Document Downloads