Lewis, Peter J. (2009) A note on the Doomsday Argument. [Preprint]
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Abstract
I argue that the Doomsday argument fails because it fails to take into account the lesson of the Sleeping Beauty puzzle.
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| Item Type: | Preprint |
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| Keywords: | Doomsday Argument, Sleeping Beauty, confirmation, self-location. |
| Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction |
| Depositing User: | Peter J. Lewis |
| Date Deposited: | 14 Jul 2009 |
| Last Modified: | 07 Oct 2010 11:18 |
| Item ID: | 4761 |
| URI: | http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/4761 |
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