Abstract

I apply some of the lessons from quantum theory, in particular from Bell’s theorem, to a debate on the foundations of decision theory and causation. By tracing a formal analogy between the basic assumptions of Causal Decision Theory (CDT)—which was developed partly in response to Newcomb’s problem—and those of a Local Hidden Variable (LHV) theory in the context of quantum mechanics, I show that an agent who acts according to CDT and gives any nonzero credence to some possible causal interpretations underlying quantum phenomena should bet against quantum mechanics in some feasible game scenarios involving entangled systems, no matter what evidence they acquire. As a consequence, either the most accepted version of decision theory is wrong, or it provides a practical distinction, in terms of the prescribed behaviour of rational agents, between some metaphysical hypotheses regarding the causal structure underlying quantum mechanics.
1 Introduction

Quantum theory has motivated not only radical revisions in our understanding of physical theory, but in our understanding of other areas of knowledge which seemed a priori quite dissociated from physics. The most recent example is the application of the framework of quantum mechanics to the theory of information processing, leading to the very active fields of quantum information and computation. One of the precursors to these more recent developments was the work of John Bell (1964), inaugurating an area of research that has been aptly termed experimental metaphysics by Abner Shimony (1989). Bell and others since him have shown that a much more intimate relationship between physics and philosophy is not only possible but fruitful. After Bell we have come to recognise novel ways in which bare experimental data can have a direct influence on philosophically-oriented inquiry, and how such inquiry can indeed be a precursor to new and useful views on physical theory, which can eventually even lead to new technologies.

Here I argue that the lessons from quantum theory can shed light on an important debate in the philosophical foundations of decision theory. This debate started when the philosopher Robert Nozick published (Nozick, 1969) a puzzle introduced to him by the physicist William Newcomb—the so-called Newcomb’s paradox or Newcomb’s problem. Attempts to solve this problem and its variants have generated waves of activity in the philosophy of decision theory. The consensus at present seems to be around the Causal Decision Theory (CDT) proposed and defended by Gibbard and Harper (1978), Lewis (1981a), Skyrms (1982), among others.

The influence of this problem goes beyond the mere resolution of the original paradox, and even beyond the foundations of decision theory. It has also had an effect on debates about the status of causal laws, since Nancy Cartwright’s influential article “Causal laws and effective strategies” (Cartwright, 1979), where she argues that causal laws cannot be reduced to probabilistic laws of association, and that they are necessary to distinguish between effective and ineffective strategies.

For philosophers the importance of this debate is obvious, but should physicists also care? I believe so. An increasingly popular view among physicists is the idea that quantum mechanics is a theory of information, and that quantum states are nothing but concise encapsulations of subjective probabilities. In this Bayesian view of quantum states (Caves et al., 2002; Fuchs, 2003; Fuchs et al., 2005), the gambling commitments of rational agents should mirror the probabilities assigned by quantum mechanics to the possible outcomes of possible observations following a given physical preparation procedure. It is well known that several problems occur when one tries to attribute underlying causal stories to quantum phenomena, but there are also many open problems in the project of quantum Bayesianism. One of them is that, as opposed to the case of classical probability, there is still no foundationally attractive way to justify the structure of quantum mechanics from something as plausible and intuitive as a Dutch-book argument. The present work is part of recent attempts to be explicit about the inclusion of an agent in quantum mechanics—through their decisions.

Decision theory has been used as the basis of a foundational program started by Deutsch (1999) and further developed by Wallace (2006; 2007) in the context of the Everett (Many-Worlds) interpretation of quantum mechanics. However, while that program aims at reconstructing features of quantum mechanics from decision theory, the present work goes in the opposite direction: here I will rather argue against a certain theory of decision based on lessons from quantum mechanics. Furthermore, here we attempt to go beyond the use of a specific ontological framework, but take as starting point the epistemological (or more correctly, decision-theoretic) aspect of the theory. Specific ontological models or frameworks will be considered, as they will be seen to be fundamental in determining the decision-theoretic prescriptions according to causal decision theory. But it is important to emphasise that, in the spirit of experimental metaphysics, we study the space of possible metaphysical theories without a particular commitment to one or another beyond what is required by experimental data. A similar approach can be found in recent studies of so-called ontological models in the context of quantum foundations (Spekkens, 2005; Rudolph, 2006; Harrigan et al., 2007; Harrigan and Rudolph, 2006).

\footnote{For a recent account of the progress in that direction, see (Fuchs and Schack, 2009).}
2007).

If CDT is right, causal considerations must take priority in generating the effective probabilities that rational agents should use for their gambling commitments. According to CDT, rational agents should base their decision on so-called causal probabilities, even when those are distinct from the subjective (or evidential) probabilities refined by evidence. This is then not a purely philosophical question (to use the physicist’s jargon for problems which do not have direct empirical implications), but has a direct consequence in the prescribed behaviour of rational agents. The debate is not between opposing interpretations of operationally equivalent theories, but between opposing theories with conflicting prescriptions. If quantum mechanics is nothing but a theory of information, and if probabilities are nothing but the gambling commitments of rational agents, and if one of the lessons of quantum mechanics is the demise of causal concepts in the prescription of those probabilities, it should be a problem for the Bayesian-inclined physicist that the most popular version of decision theory attempts to put causation at the root of an agent’s effective probability assignments. This work can thus be seen as an attempt to make decision theory "safe" for quantum Bayesianism.2

The main goal of this paper is to make this concern explicit and trace a formal parallel between CDT and the class of Local Hidden Variable (LHV) theories which are discussed in the context of Bell’s theorem (Bell, 1964, 1987). This parallel seems to lend support to Bayesian Decision Theory (BDT) over CDT. I will show that, in general, CDT represents a limitation on the space of effective probability assignments available to an agent—just as is the case with LHV’s in quantum mechanics—and this can under certain conditions render an agent incapable of adjusting their effective probabilities (even if they adjust their subjective probabilities) to match arbitrarily well to some possible observations, no matter what evidence they accumulate. In fact, I will argue that even in some routine quantum experiments, a causal decision theorist would be forced, under a plausible analysis of the prescriptions of CDT, to bet against some observed predictions of quantum mechanics. As a result, either CDT is wrong, or it surprisingly provides a practical distinction, in terms of the prescribed behaviour or rational agents, between some causal hypotheses underlying quantum mechanics.

2 Newcomb’s problem

The original Newcomb problem (Nozick, 1969) is as follows. You are in a room with two boxes, labelled 1 and 2. Box 2, you can see, contains a thousand dollars. Box 1 is closed. A Predictor, in whom you have high confidence to be able to predict your own choices (she has accurately predicted your choices in several similar situations in the past, say), proposes the following game to you: you can either choose to take both boxes in front of you, or choose only Box 1. She tells you that before you entered the room, she predicted what you would do. She also tells you that if she predicted that you were going to take only Box 1, she has put a million dollars inside. If she predicted you would take both boxes, she has put nothing in it. What should you do?

Bayesian decision theory prescribes the maximisation of expected utility. In a general decision situation, we denote by $A_i$, $i \in \{1, 2, ..., n\}$ the several actions available to the agent, and by $O_j$, $j \in \{1, 2, ..., m\}$ the possible outcomes. The agent ascribes to each pair action/outcome a numerical utility $u(A_i, O_j)$ and a conditional probability $P(O_j|A_i)$. Since by assumption the $O_j$ form a complete set of mutually exclusive events, $\sum_j P(O_j|A_i) = 1$. The Bayesian (or evidential) expected utility of each action is therefore

$$EU(A_i) = \sum_j P(O_j|A_i) u(A_i, O_j).$$

2Although I should mention that I disagree with aspects of the quantum Bayesianism defended by Fuchs et al. In particular, I think this approach would be much more productive if it focused on the program of attempting to derive as much of quantum mechanics as possible from information- or decision-theoretic principles, and abstained from opposing specific ontological models. After all, everyone can agree that there are such things as subjective probabilities associated to experimental outcomes (even if some may disagree on whether or not there are also other kinds of probabilities), and thus everyone could find it interesting to know whether the probabilities prescribed by quantum mechanics can be derived from information-theoretic principles (even if they could also be derived from a constructive ontological model).
Now denote by $O_1$ the event that you find a million dollars in Box 1, and by $A_1$ and $A_2$ your action of choosing Box 1 and both boxes, respectively. Your information about the Predictor’s efficacy is represented by the fact that your conditional probabilities are such that $P(O_1|A_1) \gg P(O_1|A_2)$. The Bayesian expected utilities are

$$EU(A_1) = P(O_1|A_1) \times 1,000,000 + [1 - P(O_1|A_1)] \times 0$$
$$EU(A_2) = P(O_1|A_2) \times 1,001,000 + [1 - P(O_1|A_2)] \times 1,000.$$  

(2)

We assume that the utilities of each pair action/outcome are just the money values received by the agent. This is not a restrictive assumption, as one could adapt the money values if necessary such that the utilities are as required. It is easy to see that if $P(O_1|A_1)$ is sufficiently larger than $P(O_1|A_2)$, the expected utility of choosing one box will be larger than the expected utility of choosing both. In the circumstance of Newcomb’s problem, therefore, EDT advises you to choose one box.

3 Causal Decision Theory

Although the above answer seems correct at first, a second argument soon comes to mind: whatever I do, the first box either contains a million dollars or it doesn’t. This fact was settled in the past and is beyond the causal influence of my present choice. Nothing that I can do now will change the contents of Box 1. But regardless of whether it contains a million dollars or nothing, I’ll be better off taking the extra thousand. Therefore I should take both boxes. This is called the dominance argument, since one choice seems to dominate the other no matter what outcome obtains.

Causal Decision Theory was developed as an attempt to formalise the intuition behind the dominance argument. Gibbard and Harper (1978) claimed that the expected utility of an action should be calculated from the probabilities of counterfactuals, as opposed to the conditional probabilities that figure in (1). Under the evaluation of the probabilities of counterfactuals favoured by Gibbard and Harper, this principle of utility maximisation is therefore ambiguous. Horgan (1981), for example, argues that a "backtracking" analysis of the counterfactuals leads to the prescription of one-boxing.

There is a consensus, however, on the final mathematical form of the utility formula defended by CDT (Lewis, 1981a; Skyrms, 1982; Armendt, 1986). According to these authors, the correct quantity to be maximised in a decision situation is the causal expected utility

$$CEU(A_i) = \sum_j \left[ \sum_{\lambda} P(K_\lambda) P(O_j|A_i; K_\lambda) \right] u(A_i, O_j),$$  

(3)

where the $K_\lambda$s represent the "dependency hypotheses" (Lewis, 1981a) available to the agent, and I use the notation of separating the contemplated actions $A_i$ from other propositions with a semicolon. A dependency hypothesis, according to Lewis (1981a), is "a maximally specific proposition about how the things [the agent] cares about do and do not depend causally on his present actions". On Skyrms’ (1982) account, the propositions $K_\lambda$ represent the possible "causal propensities" that are objectively instantiated in the world. Lewis (1981a) reads Skyrms as describing them as “maximally specific specifications of the factors outside the agent’s influence (at the time of decision) which are causally relevant to the outcome of the action’s action”.

The important thing to note, regardless of the interpretational fine print, is that formally the expression in brackets represents a “causal probability” defined as

$$P_c(O_j|A_i) \equiv \sum_{\lambda} P(K_\lambda) P(O_j|A_i; K_\lambda).$$  

(4)
which is in general distinct from the conditional probability, which can be decomposed as (assuming that there exists a joint probability distribution for the $K$ probabilities differ from the conditional probabilities. A Newcomb-type problem can be concocted, by appropriate choice of utilities, in any circumstance where causal correlations may exist in the expression (5) for the conditional probability. I will call a "medical Newcomb problem".

For those unfamiliar with this formalism, and who lack a clear intuition for two-boxing in the original Newcomb problem, this may sound like an unjustifiable move. So as not to be unfair to the causal decision theorist, I will present the kind of case where the intuitions favour CDT the most: the "medical Newcomb problems".

In a common version of a medical Newcomb problem, it is found that smoking does not cause lung cancer. Instead, it is discovered that the correlation between smoking and lung cancer is a spurious one, arising from the existence of a common cause, a certain gene $G$. The presence of this gene is correlated with smoking, so that it occurs in, say, 20% of smokers but only in 2% of nonsmokers. It is also highly correlated with lung cancer: almost all bearers of this gene develop lung cancer if they don’t die earlier of other causes, and the likelihood of a non-bearer to develop lung cancer is negligible. Given the presence (or absence) of the gene, however, smoking is rendered uncorrelated with lung cancer.

Now imagine that Fred knows all this and is trying to decide whether or not to smoke (or continue smoking). He likes smoking, but the prospect of cancer outweighs his desire for smoking. Suppose his desires, and the (evidential) conditional probabilities he takes the available evidence to imply in his case, are as represented on Table 1.

Given these data, the evidential expected utility of smoking is $EU(S) = -19$ and that of not smoking is $EU(\neg S) = -2$. BDT therefore advises Fred not to smoke. Within causal decision theory, on the other hand, and taking the presence of the gene as the dependency hypothesis in (3), $P(C|S; G) = P(C|\neg S; G)$ and $P(C|S; \neg G) = P(C|\neg S; \neg G)$, therefore whatever Fred’s prior beliefs $P(G)$ about his genetic endowment are, $CEU(S) > CEU(\neg S)$, and CDT advises him to smoke, as is intuitively the correct prescription for most people.

Although this example seems to strongly support CDT, there are defences available which allow BDT to achieve the same prescription. I will return to these in Section 5.

### 3.1 Regions of causal influence

There is an important point to emphasise. Causal decision theory assumes not only that there exists a distribution over a complete specification of the causal propensities in general but also, although perhaps less explicitly, that these dependency hypotheses screen off the correlations between an action and all events which are outside its causal influence. Formally, this means that

$$P(O_j|A_i; K_\lambda) = P(O_j|A_i; K_\lambda) = P(O_j|K_\lambda)$$

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Here I have adapted an example from Price (1986).
for all \((i, i')\), whenever \(O_j\) is outside the causal influence of \(A_i\). Therefore the causal probabilities given by Eq. (4) reduce in those cases to

$$P_c(O_j | A_i) \equiv \sum_{\lambda} P(K_{\lambda}) P(O_j | K_{\lambda}).$$

(7)

The justification for this is the belief that, for example, if I knew about the gene, my chance of cancer would not be statistically correlated with my choice of smoking; if I knew what the prediction was, the money in the box would not be correlated with my choice of picking one or both. If this assumption isn’t made, nothing prevents a direct dependence between those outcomes and my choices. In other words, if it is to serve the purpose it is meant to—i.e., to prescribe \(^6\) two-boxing \(^8\) in Newcomb-type problems—CDT necessarily needs an account of what are the sets of events “inside” and “outside” the causal influences of an action. In Newcomb problems, these are typically events that happened in the past of the action. In general, however, taking into account relativity, this region could be expanded to include all events outside the future light cone of the action—both the past light cone and space-like separated regions. In any case, the causalists need an account of what these sets are supposed to be which can be used consistently throughout all decision problems.

Of course, in particular problems the reasoning behind the assignment of event \(O\) as outside the causal influence of action \(A\) may not be due to a fundamental physical constraint such as the speed of light, but due to other constraints that arise out of an understanding of the physical situation of the problem. For example, relativity does not prohibit that a choice we make could change our genes, but this possibility is disregarded due to our understanding of genetics. Therefore the term “regions of causal influence” may not necessarily refer to actual space-time regions, but to more general sets of events. In any case, it seems that the regions of causal influence should be taken from our best scientific theories about the physical situation underlying a decision scenario.

This formalism seems to miss an important issue, however. What if some of the outcomes in a decision situation are outside the agent’s influence, but some are not? Let us suppose we have a set of outcomes \(a_j\) which the agent takes to be within the causal influence of the choices \(A_i\), and another set of outcomes \(b_l\) which are taken to be outside the agent’s possible causal influence. Now suppose the pay-offs of a decision situation depend on both of these events. CDT then needs a joint causal probability \(P_c(a_j, b_l | A_i)\). The fact that we are now considering two variables isn’t important—this should still be given by the obvious generalisation of (4),

$$P_c(a_j, b_l | A_i) \equiv \sum_{\lambda} P(K_{\lambda}) P(a_j, b_l | A_i; K_{\lambda}).$$

(8)

We can always decompose the conditional probability inside the summation as \(P(a_j, b_l | A_i; K_{\lambda}) = P(a_j | A_i; K_{\lambda}) P(b_l | A_i; a_j, K_{\lambda})\). And, since each \(K_{\lambda}\) represents \(^8\) a maximally specific proposition about how the things [the agent] cares about do and do not depend causally on [the agent’s] present actions\(^6\), this can be simplified to \(P(a_j, b_l | A_i; K_{\lambda}) = P(a_j | A_i; K_{\lambda}) P(b_l | K_{\lambda})\). The reason, as before, is that by assumption the \(b_l\)’s are not causally dependent on the \(A_i\)’s, only statistically correlated via some common cause, maximally specified by \(K_{\lambda}\). And since the \(a_j\)’s are causally dependent on the \(A_i\)’s, the \(b_l\)’s cannot depend directly on the \(a_j\)’s either. Otherwise by influencing \(a_j\) the agent could influence \(b_l\), contrary to the assumption. Substituting this expression on (8), the causal probabilities in this scenario become

$$P_c(a_j, b_l | A_i) = \sum_{\lambda} P(K_{\lambda}) P(a_j | A_i; K_{\lambda}) P(b_l | K_{\lambda}).$$

(9)

Given the utilities \(u(A_i, a_j, b_l)\), the causal expected utility which generalises Eq. (3) is

$$EU(A_i) = \sum_{j,l} \left[ \sum_{\lambda} P(K_{\lambda}) P(a_j | A_i; K_{\lambda}) P(b_l | K_{\lambda}) \right] u(A_i, a_j, b_l).$$

(10)

We could also consider a situation involving not only one but two agents. We could interpret \(b_l\) as being the outcomes observed by a second agent, who has at their disposal a number of possible choices
$B_k$. Of course, the $b_t$ are within the causal influence of $B_k$, and therefore the more general causal probabilities are given by $P_e(a_j, b_t|A_i, B_k) = \sum_{\lambda} P(K_{\lambda}) P(a_j|A_i, B_k; K_{\lambda}) P(b_t|B_k; K_{\lambda})$ if the actions $B_k$ can directly causally influence the outcomes $a_j$ (by being in their past, say), or

$$P_e(a_j, b_t|A_i, B_k) = \sum_{\lambda} P(K_{\lambda}) P(a_j|A_i; K_{\lambda}) P(b_t|B_k; K_{\lambda})$$

(11)

if they cannot.

### 3.2 Evidential and effective probabilities

I should stress the fact that for the causal decision theorist there are two kinds of probabilities: those that represent their evidence, their degrees of belief, about the possible outcomes conditional on the performance of each action available to them, and the probabilities that they should use to ground their decisions. I will call the former kind of probability the “evidential” or “subjective” probabilities, and the latter kind the agent’s “effective” probabilities. For evidential decision theorists, these two probabilities coincide: they ground their actions on their subjective conditional probabilities. For causal decision theorists they come apart in scenarios such as Newcomb’s. They can also come apart, I will argue in the next section, in actually feasible scenarios involving quantum experiments.

It is important however to remind the reader that the causal decision theorist does not deny the existence or meaning of the subjective probabilities. They indeed believe in the same subjective conditional probabilities. They believe that the one-boxers in Newcomb’s original problem are more likely to come out richer than the two-boxers, but they believe they come out richer for the wrong reasons. As Lewis (1981b) puts it:

They have their millions and we have our thousands, and they think this goes to show the error of our ways. They think we are not rich because we have irrationally chosen not to have our millions.

We reply that we never were given any choice about whether to have a million... The reason why we are not rich is that the riches were reserved for the irrational.

This implies that while the causalist believes in the same conditional probabilities as the evidentialist, with apparently the same interpretation, the causalist also believes that those should not ground their decisions. Instead, they take their effective probabilities to be the causal probabilities (4) (which implicitly mean in general, as I argued, (9)).

It is important to note that the effective probabilities of a causal decision theorist need not be updated by evidence in the same manner as the evidential probabilities. For example, in the original Newcomb scenario, repeatedly playing the game and observing strong correlations between one-boxing and a million dollars, and two-boxing and a thousand dollars, could influence the agent’s evidential probabilities, which should be properly updated through Bayes’ rule. But it could not change the agent’s causal probabilities; by assumption the contents of the box are outside the agent’s causal influence, and the correlations are (by assumption) explained in that case by the existence of a common cause for the agent’s choices as well as the contents of the box. This refusal to change his decisions even in the face of the winnings of the one-boxer is what is illustrated by the Lewis quotation above.

To be sure, it is important that the agent’s causal story can explain the evidential correlations. For example, in the smoking gene scenario, the assumption that the gene causes both smoking and lung cancer explains the correlation between the two. In Newcomb’s problem the Predictor’s ability explains the correlations between the agent’s choices and the contents of the box. If some evidence arises that is incompatible with the causal story held by the agent, then of course the agent would be compelled to revise their causal hypotheses. In general, however, if the agent’s causal hypotheses provide a causal explanation for the observed correlations, then the correlations cannot suggest a change in those hypotheses. Correlations which are already expected or predicted by the causal hypotheses cannot present any new information to modify those.

If the causal probabilities were updated in the same manner as the subjective probabilities, then CDT and BDT would tend to agree in the long run, and the conflict between the two would disappear.
The idea that causal probabilities should tend to agree with subjective probabilities (under some interpretation of causation) is a position that can and has been defended, for example, by Price (1991). The arguments in this paper will be directed towards those who are not swayed by Price’s program and maintain that there can be differences between causal and subjective or evidential probabilities (and thus between the prescriptions of CDT and BDT).

One of the reasons Newcomb’s problem is so controversial, I believe, is that Newcomb-type problems have been generally purely hypothetical and quite far-fetched scenarios. The adherence to each contender theory never had to be tested in practical decision situations. In the following I will make a parallel that should serve to provide a feasible example.

4 The parallel with Bell’s theorem

The main argument of this paper is based on a formal and conceptual analogy between the causal probabilities as applied to a Newcomb scenario and the probabilities prescribed by a local hidden variable theory in the context of quantum mechanics. In this section I will present this analogy.

Let me first introduce the relevant notation. Alice and Bob are agents who have at their disposal a number of possible measurements ($A_i$ for Alice, $B_k$ for Bob) each of which with a number of possible outcomes $a_i^j, b_k^l$, respectively (we could introduce other agents if necessary, of course, but two will be sufficient for our purposes). We will henceforth constrain ourselves for simplicity to the cases in which all measurements have the same number of outcomes, and identify $a_i^j = a_i'^j = a_j$ for all $i, i'$, and similarly for the $b_k^l$. Alice assigns a subjective conditional probability $P(a_j|A_i)$ to each possible outcome of each possible experiment.

A general hidden variable theory for the phenomena observed by Alice and Bob consists of a probability distribution over the elements $\lambda$ of a set of hidden variables $\Lambda$, together with a distribution for the possible experimental outcomes (given $\lambda$) which reproduces the observed statistics, i.e.

$$P_{HV}(a_j, b_l|A_i, B_k) \equiv \sum_{\lambda} P(\lambda)P(a_j, b_l|A_i, B_k; \lambda). \quad (12)$$

These variables are supposed to represent a sufficiently complete specification of physical variables that are causally relevant to the outcomes of the experiments under study. The requirement that they be causally relevant is translated within classical relativistic mechanics to the requirement that they must be specified in the past light cones of those experiments. The important point is that they must be necessarily specified in some region of space-time which can “causally influence” the experiments, according to some theory of causation. There is at the outset an important assumption used in the equation above:

**Statistical independence.** The hidden variables are statistically independent of the choice of experiments made by Alice and Bob, i.e., $P(\lambda|A_i, B_k) = P(\lambda)$. Some authors call this the “free will” assumption, or perhaps "no-retrocausality" assumption. I prefer not to use the term "free will" so as not to presuppose an interpretation of the concept of free will which precludes an account in which it is compatible with determinism. And I don’t favour the term "no-retrocausality" because although a dependence of the hidden variables on those experimental settings would be essentially indistinguishable from backwards causation from the agent’s perspective, it is logically possible for statistical independence to fail even when there is no actual backwards causation.

This assumption seems to be justified by the fact that these choices are completely arbitrary. They could be made as a function of the intensity of a measurement of the cosmic background radiation, or at the whim of the “free-willed” experimentalists. The variety and arbitrariness of possible sources seem to imply that they cannot be correlated with the variables which are causally relevant to this particular laboratory experiment.

The extra assumption that will lead to a local hidden variable theory is that there exists some such sufficient specification of variables that renders the probability of an event $E_1$ uncorrelated with
that of an event $E_2$, when the event $E_2$ is outside the region of causal influence of $E_1$. In a typical Bell scenario, this is usually translated as the requirement that Alice's and Bob's experiments are in space-like separated regions so that the following holds:

**Local causality.** $P(a_j|A_i, B_k; b_1, \lambda) = P(a_j|A_i; \lambda)$, and similarly for Bob.

With this assumption we obtain what is called a local hidden variable (LHV) model for this experimental scenario:

$$P_{LHV}(a_j, b_l|A_i, B_k) \equiv \sum_{\lambda} P(\lambda) P(a_j|A_i; \lambda) P(b_l|B_k; \lambda).$$

(13)

The analogy should start to be clear. Eqs. (11) and (13) are formally identical. I will now analyse in some more detail the Newcomb scenario discussed above to make sure that the conceptual analogies are also clear. The scenario involves not only the choices and direct observations of the agent (let us say Alice is this agent) but also the actions and the outcomes of the actions of the Predictor, which happen in a region outside the causal influence of Alice. In the Newcomb scenario, that is translated as the fact that the Predictor’s actions are in the past of Alice’s choice. Even if there is no actual Predictor (as in the smoking gene scenario) we can always model the situation by imagining those events outside Alice’s causal influence as being the actions performed and outcomes observed by an agent, with trivial actions/outcomes where necessary. This will allow a more explicit and direct comparison between the two models, without modifying in any way the prescriptions of causal decision theory.

The assumption of "statistical independence" in a general hidden variable model, which leads to Eq. (12), is formally and conceptually equivalent to the assumption that the effective causal probabilities are given by an average over the unconditional probabilities of the causal propensities $K_\lambda$, Eq. (4) (and (8)). The assumption of "local causality" which leads to a LHV model is formally and conceptually equivalent to the assumption that outcomes outside Alice’s regions of causal influence are screened by the causal propensities $K_\lambda$, Eq. (6).

Thus in the Newcomb problem we can model the situation by imagining that Bob is the Predictor. He chooses a trivial available action ($B_1$) to put a million dollars inside the closed box if and only if he predicts Alice will pick only the closed box. He will base his prediction on his knowledge of some variables $\lambda$, necessarily specified in his own past light cone. These variables, he believes, will be correlated with Alice’s future choice. He will plug these variables into an algorithm, say, and observe outcomes corresponding to the prediction that Alice will ($b_1$) pick the closed box only or ($b_2$) pick both boxes. He tells this whole story to Alice, as usual, and asks her to make her decision. She can either choose to ($A_1$) pick the closed box or ($A_2$) pick both boxes. The outcomes associated to her choice, however, cannot be whether or not the box contains a million dollars, since that is not under her direct causal influence. Those outcomes are (were) under Bob’s causal influence, not hers. This is the reasoning that leads to Eq. (7) and which allows CDT to prescribe two-boxing. So I will use the trivial outcomes: ($a_1$) she opens only one box or ($a_2$) she opens both boxes. Let us stipulate that the pay-offs depend on the explicit actions (the $a_j$’s), not on the choices, so that the utilities attributed to each possible pair of outcomes are as given by Table 2.

What are the causal probabilities that Alice should use in her decision? The scenario described above is precisely the type that led to Eq. (11), identifying $K_\lambda \leftrightarrow \lambda$ :

$$P_{c}(a_j, b_l|A_i, B_k) = \sum_{\lambda} P(\lambda) P(a_j|A_i, \lambda) P(b_l|B_k, \lambda).$$

(14)
Since there is only a trivial choice for Bob, and using the usual assumption that Alice is always able to carry out her chosen strategy, \( P(a_j|A_i, \lambda) = \delta_{ij} \), where the Kronecker delta is defined as \( \delta_{ij} = 1 \) if \( i = j \) and 0 if \( i \neq j \). This simplifies the equation above to \( P_{c}(b_l|A_i) = \sum_{\lambda} P(\lambda) P(b_l|\lambda) \), identical to Eq. (7), and which leads to the prescription of two-boxing as already argued.

4.1 Consequences of the analogy

This analogy can lead to two lines of criticism of CDT, both based on the fact that the causal probabilities can disagree with the quantum probabilities. The main line of criticism being pursued in this paper\(^4\) is to show that proper consideration of the various alternative causal hypotheses proposed as explanations for the quantum correlations will lead the causalist to bet against the outcomes predicted by quantum mechanics for certain feasible experimental situations. This will make use of a game that can be actually set up in a standard quantum optics laboratory.

I will argue that given the analogy between causal probabilities and local hidden variable models, the causalist should consistently give some weight to a local hidden variable model as their effective probabilities in the quantum-mechanical experiments. Since real experiments routinely violate these assumptions, through violation of Bell-type inequalities (Bell, 1964, 1987), the causalist would stand to lose money. I will first introduce a decision scenario with no mention of quantum mechanics, so as to make the discussion of the causalist’s decision simpler to follow. Later I will show how this scenario can be set up with a pair of entangled quantum systems, and the reasoning that leads the causalist to bet against quantum mechanics in that game.

4.1.1 The marble boxes game

Alice enters a room which has a collection of \( N \) black boxes in a long row. They are all labelled sequentially by integers from 1 to \( N \). These boxes have two buttons each: a red button and a green button. The boxes are closed and completely sealed from external influences, as far as she can tell. Each box behaves as follows: when Alice first presses one of the buttons, a marble of the same colour as the button she pressed is released from a small circular opening. Each marble has a symbol, which is either ‘+1’ or ‘−1’. Once a marble has emerged from a box, further button presses on that box do nothing.

She then hears a familiar voice coming out of a monitor in one corner of the room. The face is also familiar: it is Bob, the famous game-show host, who proposes a game to Alice. Bob says he has a set of boxes that work by the same mechanism in his studio in Brisbane, half a world away from Alice’s location in Amsterdam. His boxes are also labelled sequentially from 1 to \( N \), so that each box at Alice’s location has a corresponding one at Bob’s. He tells Alice that she can choose to press either a red button or a green button on each of her remaining boxes. He tells her that these boxes can predict whether she will press the red or green buttons. But it’s not so simple, he admits. The prediction isn’t perfect, but it’s better than even odds. Moreover, it’s encoded in a certain way so that the prediction of each individual choice cannot really be retrieved, but only inferred from the correlations between the balls coming out of her boxes and those of his own boxes.

Alice’s friend Charlie is in Bob’s studio to guarantee Alice can trust the game. Bob explains that Charlie will press a red or green button at random in the remaining of his boxes, simultaneously with Alice, and similar marbles will emerge from Bob’s boxes.

For each pair of marbles from correspondingly-numbered boxes, he will multiply the numbers printed on them (to give a product of either +1 or -1), and keep a record of the pair of colours with a code "a_r-b_r" for red-red, "a_r-b_g" for red-green, etc. After all the buttons are pressed and all the marbles are released, he will finally take the averages \( \langle a_r-b_r \rangle \), etc. of each of these values over the collection of boxes (where \( \langle a_r-b_r \rangle \) denotes the average of the +1 and −1 values of all pairs that came up red-red,

\(^4\)The other will be mentioned in a footnote in Section 4.1.4.
and so on) and plug them into the formula

$$\langle F \rangle = \langle a_r b_r \rangle + \langle a_r b_g \rangle + \langle a_g b_r \rangle - \langle a_g b_g \rangle.$$  \hfill (15)

If one or more pairs of button colours ($\langle a_r b_r \rangle$, $\langle a_r b_g \rangle$, etc) does not occur, the corresponding value will be zero. Bob says that if she chooses to play, and the value of $\langle F \rangle$ is larger than 2.8, she wins a million dollars. If $\langle F \rangle$ is less than or equal to 2.8 she goes home empty-handed. Alternatively, she can choose not to play and take home a thousand dollars, risk-free.

4.1.2 Mechanism underlying the marble boxes game

Bob explains the reasoning behind the claim that the boxes can predict Alice’s actions. Inside each box, there’s already a pair of balls—one red, one green—with numbers written on them. Let’s consider a single pair of boxes, and call the numbers on the two balls in each box. Bob explains the reasoning behind the claim that the boxes can predict Alice’s actions. Inside each box, there’s already a pair of balls—one red, one green—with numbers written on them. Let’s consider a single pair of boxes, and call the numbers on the two balls in each box. $a_r$, $a_g$, and $b_r$, $b_g$. Recall that each of these numbers can only be $+1$ or $-1$, and consider the sum $b_r + b_g$ and difference $b_r - b_g$ of the numbers on Bob’s marbles. If both marbles have the same value, then their difference is 0 and their sum is either $+2$ or $-2$; if the marbles have opposite values, their sum is 0 and their difference is $+2$ or $-2$. Now consider the formula $F = a_r (b_r + b_g) + a_g (b_r - b_g)$. If Bob’s marbles have the same value, we have $F = \pm 2 a_r$; if they have opposite values we have $F = \pm 2 a_g$. Thus, in either case, $F$ can only take on the value $+2$ or $-2$.

Multiplying out the above formula $F = a_r b_r + a_r b_g + a_g b_r - a_g b_g = \pm 2$ we see how the above analysis for a single box puts constraints on the value for $\langle F \rangle$ we should expect from the set of all boxes. That is, if Alice’s and Charlie’s choices were really random, or at least not correlated with the mechanism behind the boxes, then the expectation value of $F$ for the group of boxes would also be at most 2. After all, each average in that sum would be taken over the same ensemble of marbles. But it turns out that this average value is, in practice, always very close to the magical number of $2\sqrt{2} \approx 2.828$. The explanation for that weird situation, Bob guarantees, is that the boxes are created from a single source, and at that time the internal mechanism of the boxes somehow "knows" what buttons are going to be pressed, and prints the numbers on each pair of balls so as to ensure that $\langle F \rangle \approx 2\sqrt{2}$. In other words, the mechanism prepares a different distribution of numbers on the pair of marbles for each pair of buttons to be pressed. Therefore each of the expectation values in Eq. (15) can assume independent values, and the reasoning that restricts the value of $F$ doesn’t apply. In fact, without the assumption that the distributions for each pair of buttons are the same, the value of $\langle F \rangle$ could logically be anything between $-4$ and $+4$, since each term in that sum could be anything between $-1$ and $+1$.

Alice isn’t convinced. “What if we look inside? Then Charlie and I would be able to find out what the outcomes are supposed to be, and we could obtain information about what the boxes have predicted. Then we could do otherwise. So how’s that possible?” Bob replies that if they open the boxes, the marbles are destroyed instantaneously. And when they press a button to release one of the balls, the other ball is similarly destroyed. So they can never really find out what the prediction was; they can only recognise by the above reasoning that the boxes somehow knew what they were going to choose. This, Bob explains, is the only really secure way to avoid the information about the prediction reaching Alice, and her doing something to prevent it from happening. Otherwise, as Alice correctly pointed out, it would be impossible for these boxes to do what they do.

“Now even if you don’t believe that the numbers on the marbles are already there”, Bob continues, “even if you imagine that the number on each ball is printed just after each of you presses a button, there’s still no way that the formula $F$ could be on average more than 2. That’s because we’ll make sure that each of you presses your chosen buttons simultaneously, and as you are on opposite sides of the globe, you can trust that no communication has been exchanged between the boxes about which button you pressed”.

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4.1.3 The causalist’s decision

Alice tries to think carefully about it. She has watched this show many times, and knows that almost everyone who takes the challenge walks home with a million dollars. But whatever she does, the numbers on the balls are fixed, and there’s nothing she can do about that. Bob’s description of the mechanism of the boxes explains why the correlations most people observe can be such that \( F > 2.8 \), but the numbers that will come out of each box cannot causally depend on what she does now. Alice has read about causal decision theory, and decides to base her decision on it.

The first thing she needs to do is to calculate the causal probability that \( F > 2.8 \), given each sequence of button presses at her disposal. She really has \( 2^N + 1 \) choices available: to press the buttons in any of the possible \( 2^N \) combinations of red-green, or not to press the buttons.

Alice trusts that the numbers in the marbles are determined in advance of their choices. Or at least she trusts that the outcome of each individual box cannot depend on the choice of experiment made in the associated box in the other city, since there is no way a signal could communicate that information between the boxes. Let us denote by \( K_\lambda \) a causal hypothesis that encodes those values. In other words, \( K_\lambda \) determines the values of all numbers on the marbles. She understands that the boxes may be predicting what she is going to choose, but according to causal decision theory she can’t take that correlation into account in the calculation of causal probabilities. Therefore the causal probability for her to obtain a particular pair of values for a pair of boxes where she chooses to press, say, the red button (we will denote this choice by \( A_R \)) and Charlie chooses to press, say, the green button (we will denote this by \( B_G \)) is

\[
P_c(a_r, b_g|A_R, B_G) = \sum_\lambda P(K_\lambda) P(a_r|A_R; K_\lambda)P(b_g|B_G; K_\lambda),
\]

following Eq. (11). Denoting by \( \langle a_r \rangle_\lambda \) the expectation value of \( a_r \) given the variable \( K_\lambda \), i.e. \( \langle a_r \rangle_\lambda = P(a_r = 1|A_R; K_\lambda) - P(a_r = -1|A_R; K_\lambda) \), and similarly for the other values, we thus obtain for each of the boxes

\[
\langle a_r b_g \rangle_c = \sum_\lambda P(K_\lambda) \langle a_r \rangle_\lambda \langle b_g \rangle_\lambda.
\]

Now Alice of course attributes the same underlying distribution of \( K_\lambda \) to all of the pairs of boxes. After all, as far as she is concerned, they are all identical. Therefore, the causal expectation value \( \langle a_r b_g \rangle_c \) for the subset of boxes where she chose to press the red button and Charlie chose the green button will be just that given by Eq. (17). This will be the same, therefore, regardless of what is the subset of boxes for which they choose the combination red-green. The same argument tells us that the causal expectation value of \( \langle a_r b_g \rangle_c \), \( \langle a_g b_r \rangle_c \) and \( \langle a_g b_g \rangle_c \) will also be given by an equation of the form (17), and will be independent of Alice’s and Charlie’s particular choices. And therefore the causal expectation value of \( F_c \) will be

\[
\langle F \rangle_c = \sum_\lambda P(K_\lambda) [\langle a_r \rangle_\lambda (\langle b_r \rangle_\lambda + \langle b_g \rangle_\lambda) + \langle a_g \rangle_\lambda (\langle b_r \rangle_\lambda - \langle b_g \rangle_\lambda)].
\]

The argument of section 4.1.2 tells Alice that each of the terms in square brackets is at most 2, and therefore the value of \( \langle F \rangle_c \) can also be at most 2.6 Alice therefore decides not to play the game and takes home the risk-free thousand dollars.

The causalists could object that the example is not directly analogous to the original Newcomb problem. I do not claim it is. But CDT should not be valid only for the original Newcomb problem. It should be able to be applied consistently to every decision problem, given the agents’ beliefs about the causal structure of the world. With the interpretation about the causal structure given in the problem, this analysis leads to the prescription exemplified above. In any case, I will present below

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6Here I allow for those values to be determined probabilistically by the \( K_\lambda \) for generality. Of course, in the deterministic case we simply have that \( P(a_r = 1|A_R; K_\lambda) \in \{0,1\} \) and so on.

6It would be possible, of course, for the actual value of \( F \) to be larger than 2. But we assume for simplicity that the number of boxes is large enough that she should not reasonably expect large deviations from the expected value.
a modified Newcomb problem that is closer to the marble boxes game, so as to sharpen the reader’s intuition with this scenario.

There are a million closed boxes, and an open box with $1000. Alice can pick one and only one of the closed boxes. She can also take home the open one if she so chooses. If the Predictor predicted Alice would choose just one closed box instead of a closed box and the open one, then the Predictor has also made a prediction about which one of the million closed boxes Alice would pick and has put the money into that box. If Alice was predicted to pick the open box as well, the million dollars have been placed in one of the closed boxes at random. Her evidential expected utility given that she picks only a closed box is much larger than that given that she picks also the open box, because she believes the Predictor is sufficiently accurate. Suppose Alice decided to pick only box 3679, say, and found $1 million in it. Can she consistently believe (without a belief in retrocausality) that the fact that box 3679 contained $1 million was caused by her choice to pick it? Of course not. Box 3679, she believes, has also made a prediction about which one of the million closed boxes Alice would pick and has put the money into that box. If Alice was predicted to pick the open box as well, the million dollars have been placed in one of the closed boxes at random. Her evidential expected utility given that she picks only a closed box is much larger than that given that she picks also the open box, because she believes the Predictor is sufficiently accurate. Suppose Alice decided to pick only box 3679, say, and found $1 million in it. Can she consistently believe (without a belief in retrocausality) that the fact that box 3679 contained $1 million was caused by her choice to pick it? Of course not. Box 3679, she believes, already contained $1 million dollars before she picked it. It contained a million dollars because the Predictor put it there. And she put it there because she predicted Alice would pick that particular box.

Now suppose Alice is a causal decision theorist. She believes her choice cannot cause the contents of the boxes to change. For all she knows, there is a million dollars inside one of the closed boxes, but she doesn’t know which one. Even though her evidential probability that it will be behind the box that she chooses is high—if she chooses just one of the closed boxes—CDT says she can’t take that correlation into account in her decision any more than she can take into account the correlation in the standard two-box Newcomb problem. The causal probability that she gets a million dollars given that she picks one of the closed boxes is given by Eq. (7), with an unconditional average over the possible states of the boxes—i.e., it is 1 in a million. Therefore the causal expectation value for picking just one of the closed boxes is just $1, and CDT says she should take the $1000.

4.1.4 The Bell game

As the reader familiar with Bell’s theorem already noticed, the marble boxes scenario can be arranged with a pair of entangled quantum systems. Bob’s formula is just the expression on the left side of the Bell-CHSH inequality (Clauser et al., 1969), which has the limit of $2$ within local hidden variable models. The red/green buttons play the role of the type of measurement to be performed on each particle, and the numbers on the balls represent the two possible outcomes of these measurements, which can be given the values of $\pm 1$. However, quantum mechanics allows the value of $\langle F \rangle$ to be as much as $2\sqrt{2}$ for pure entangled states of the pair of particles, with appropriate measurement settings.

I will argue that every causalist—even those who know about Bell’s theorem—should bet against the predictions of quantum mechanics in the Bell game$^7$. However, there is a subtlety: there are

\footnote{Here I will point out the other line of criticism mentioned in the beginning of Section 4.1. A causalist who has a strong belief in local causality, perhaps due to lack of knowledge of Bell’s theorem, and who is presented with a story similar to that of the marble boxes game, would not be able to modify their bets even in the face of a losing history, as discussed in Section 3.2. The evidence acquired with the losing history could change their subjective probabilities about the situation, but those are effectively useless as far as their gambling commitments are concerned. Given their best theories about the causal structure of the world (presumably the causal structure implied by the theory of relativity, with forwards causality) the only explanation for the correlations in the marble boxes game is in fact a common cause for their choices and the numbers in the marbles. Since this hypothesis explains the correlations, more data about the correlations cannot change the agents’ prior beliefs about the causal structure. They would maintain their decisions even when faced with strong evidence that the correlations can indeed be such that it would be advantageous to play the game, just as they would have to maintain their decision to pick two boxes in Newcomb’s problem regardless of how much evidence they acquire about the correlation between their choices and the contents of the closed box.

This criticism may require a particular type of causalist, perhaps a non-existent type. A causalist that may have fallen in this category may argue with hindsight that they have simply been cheated in this game, and that their decision theory is not at fault. I won’t try to disagree with this conclusion. However, this discussion seems to point at another problem for the causalist, i.e. to explain how their causal hypotheses are modified by evidence. It would be a challenge to the causalist’s refusal to revise their causal stories in the face of the evidence in the Newcomb scenario. That is, it would be a challenge to explain in which sense the Newcomb scenario is different from the quantum case that no amount of evidence (apart from “inside information” about the workings of the Predictor’s system) can justify a modification of

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several alternative causal hypotheses for the correlations given by quantum mechanics, some of which would lead to the conclusion of section 4.1.3, some of which wouldn’t. The prescription of CDT will depend on the causal hypothesis entertained by the agent. The problem here is that there is no consensus about what the causal structure underlying quantum mechanics is. Let us analyse some of the possibilities:

1. **Acausal correlations.** A common view is that quantum correlations do not involve causation—they are *acausal*. This view seems to present a problem for CDT. If the correlations are acausal, then it must be the case that the distant measurement outcome is *not* caused by the local choice of measurement (it is not caused by anything for that matter). This view would presumably maintain that any *causal* effects are still restricted to the future light cone of an action (otherwise there would be no reason for the unusual claim that quantum correlations are acausal), and we should obtain for the causal probabilities allowed in this hypothesis the same mathematical form as (11).

2. **Nonlocal causality.** The view that there is some form of nonlocal causation involved in quantum correlations (e.g., Bohmian mechanics). In this case, causal probabilities would coincide with the quantum probabilities.

3. **Superdeterminism.** This is the hypothesis that local causality is still valid, but that the independence assumption fails, i.e., the hidden variables are correlated with the choices of measurements in much the same way as in the marble boxes example. Bell (1987) referred to this possibility as "superdeterminism". This hypothesis has very low credibility in general—even though it is the only one fully compatible with forwards relativistic causality, as far as I am aware—since it would require conspiratorial correlations. It is a logical possibility however, as acknowledged by Bell himself. In this case the causal probabilities would be given by Eq. (11).

4. **Retrocausality.** Depending on whether one also assumes local causality, this hypothesis could be formally indistinguishable from Hypothesis 3, but would postulate retrocausality as an explanation for the correlations (Price, 1996), and thus a failure of the independence assumption. The causal probabilities would then be the same as the quantum probabilities.

Being logical possibilities, all of which with some advantages (and disadvantages) over the others, a rational agent should ascribe some credence, even if very small, to each of these possible causal hypotheses. Certainly Hypothesis 3, and I believe also Hypothesis 1, both lead to a situation where causal probabilities are given by Eq. (11) and thus diverge from the quantum probabilities in general. In the case of Hypothesis 3, that situation is clear, as it is analogous to the marble boxes example. Either way, some nonzero credence (call it \( \epsilon \)) should be assigned to some hypotheses where the causal and quantum probabilities differ.

How should CDT deal with these different hypotheses? The obvious approach is to understand the causal variables \( K_\lambda \) in Eq. (8) as really representing *two* variables: one that describes which general
causal hypothesis one is considering (e.g., 1, 2, 3 or 4 above) and the second describing the actual causal variables within each hypothesis (e.g., the hidden variables within 3). Grouping together all causal hypotheses according to the prescribed causal probabilities (according to whether or not they allow agreement with the quantum probabilities), and representing the credence on causal probabilities of the form (11) by $\epsilon$, we arrive at

$$P_c(a_j, b_l|A_i, B_k) = \epsilon \sum_{\lambda} P(K_{\lambda}) P(a_j|A_i; K_{\lambda}) P(b_l|B_k; K_{\lambda})$$

$$+ (1 - \epsilon) \sum_{\xi} P(K_{\xi}) P(a_j, b_l|A_i, B_k; K_{\xi}),$$

(18)

where I have used the subscript $\lambda$ to indicate the causal variables associated with Hypothesis 3 (or any hypothesis that leads to the same form for causal probabilities, such as perhaps Hypothesis 1 as argued above), and $\xi$ to indicate causal variables associated with hypotheses that allow the causal probabilities to be equal to the quantum prescription.

As shown in section 4.1.3, the causal probabilities prescribed by the first term will lead to a bound of $2$ on $\langle F \rangle$, whereas the other term would be bounded by the maximal quantum-mechanical expectation value of $2\sqrt{2}$. The weighted causal expectation value of $\langle F \rangle$ would therefore be $\langle F \rangle_c \leq 2\epsilon + 2\sqrt{2}(1 - \epsilon)$. For any nonzero value of $\epsilon$, therefore, that expectation value can never reach $2\sqrt{2}$, and Bob can always formulate a game analogous to the marble boxes game simply by changing the boundary between the region where Alice gets the million-dollar payoff and that in which she gets nothing. With enough statistics (and this can always be arranged in principle) the actual expectation value can be confidently above this bound, leading to the same situation as in the example. Therefore this argument against causal decision theory does not depend on a strong belief in any causal hypothesis, but merely on the acceptance that each of those are logical possibilities which have some merit (and therefore must be given some nonzero, even if arbitrarily small, credence).

It can be argued against this conclusion that one usually assumes that we are allowed to ignore extremely unlikely hypotheses in our decisions. Consider, say, the hypothesis that having a cup of tea would result in the destruction of the universe. Surely, the argument goes, we don’t need to consider all logically possible hypotheses?

My response to this criticism is that we don’t consider all possible hypotheses because we make a pre-judgement that no further hypotheses would change our decisions, and that further considerations would only introduce unnecessary complications in the calculations. Most tea drinkers attribute an exceedingly small probability for the destruction of the universe conditional on their drinking tea. But if a tea drinker were to give any appreciable probability to this hypothesis, it would certainly be irrational for them to have that cup of tea.

Further, in a situation like the referee’s example, not only would these kinds of unlikely hypotheses have negligible effects on the decisions, but there would usually be equally arbitrary competing hypotheses pulling the decision the other way: the hypothesis that NOT having a given cup of tea will lead to the destruction of the universe is just as (un)likely as the one that having that cup of tea will do so, and precisely cancels the effect of the first.

There is also an important difference between the tea example and the hypothesis of superdeterminism. Not only there are more reasons to believe the latter—and therefore it should have a larger, even if still small, credence—but the argument holds for any nonzero value attributed to this credence. Besides, the causal hypotheses underlying quantum mechanics do not affect the observable evidential probabilities, whereas the tea hypothesis changes the expected probabilities and utilities of the possible outcomes.

In any case, it is not necessary to hang onto the idea that one should assign nonzero probabilities to every logically possible causal hypothesis. All that is needed is that one assigns some nonzero credence

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*This example was brought to my attention by an anonymous referee.*
to Hypothesis 3, or to Hypothesis 1 with the analysis above. Since our best theory of causal structure is Einstein’s theory of relativity, which according to Bell’s analysis implies local causality, and given that there are options available to explain the quantum predictions while upholding local causality (and either violating statistical independence or believing in acausal correlations), it seems that we have reasons not to completely reject those hypotheses.

An option for the causalist is to bite the bullet and maintain, with Lewis, that the riches in the Bell game are reserved for the irrational just as much as in the Newcomb game. This would then, interestingly, provide a practical means to distinguish between different causal hypotheses underlying quantum mechanics. Depending on their credences on the various alternatives, different agents who act according to CDT would have different thresholds for which they would accept to play the Bell game. Their gambling commitments at different formulations of the game would therefore be evidence of their credences on underlying causal hypotheses, all of which being otherwise empirically indistinguishable. In other words, varying degrees of belief in metaphysical hypotheses would surprisingly lead to different prescriptions for the explicit behaviour of rational agents.

5 Communicated vs. non-communicated predictions

The scenario proposed in this paper brings up an interesting discussion which I find worth mentioning here. The existence of a further knowledgeable agent has been sometimes considered as intuition pumps for the Newcomb problem. Schlesinger (1974), for example, considered the existence of a perfectly knowledgeable well-wisher agent who can see the contents of the closed box and give advice to the agent in the original Newcomb problem. Clearly this well-wisher would always advise the agent to choose both boxes. Isn’t it in the best interest of the agent to follow the advice of a well-wisher who has more knowledge than herself about the situation?

Note, however, that whatever the contents of the box, the advice of the well-wisher would always be the same. Therefore the well-wisher does not convey any new information to the agent, despite the appearances. This is the crucial point: for a Newcomb problem to exist in the first place, the information about the relevant causal factors cannot be available to the choosing agent, regardless of whether it is available to other agents. If this information was available, nothing could prevent the agent from choosing so as to falsify the prediction; the prediction therefore could not be accurate independently of the agent’s choice, in contradiction with the premise of the problem. No metaphysical "free-will" is necessary for this conclusion. All that is necessary is for an agent to be a physical system able to carry out the deterministic algorithm: "If I find that I was predicted to do $A_1$, I do $A_2$, and vice-versa".

In fact, we could imagine, quite reasonably, that artificial-intelligence (AI) programs could be constructed to take decisions in situations where they could be caught up in a Newcomb problem. After all, there is no mystery involved in predicting the actions of a program; all you need is to run another copy of it with the same inputs\(^9\). Perhaps these programs could "know" that they are in a Newcomb problem: some of the inputs could be a prediction of the program’s own output, which the programs could empirically observe to be accurate at better than even odds as required. Suppose a company is trying to decide whether to build their AI agents with causal or Bayesian decision theory. Clearly the preferred algorithm in this case would be BDT.

There may be a way to block this conclusion: perhaps the AI could have access to all the relevant parts of its own algorithm. It would therefore be able to know in advance what it would have been predicted to choose. This would not mean, however, that the AI would be able to perform better in Newcomb problems. On the contrary, it would mean that it would not be able to find itself in Newcomb problems in the first place. This is the essence of the "tickle defence" of BDT. It was first proposed by Horgan (1981) in reference to the "smoking gene" problem reproduced in Section 3. His argument was that in this case the flaw is in the assumption that the agent needs to act before he has the relevant information to determine the likelihood of getting lung cancer. He does not, because

\(^9\)An argument for one-boxing involving computer simulations can be found in (Aaronson, 2005).
his own desirabilities (and past behaviour) give him the bad news already." With that information, Horgan argues, the agent can screen off the conditional probabilities such that the probabilities of having or not the gene (and therefore of developing lung cancer) are independent of his choice. There are some more sophisticated variations on this type of argument (Eells, 1985; Price, 1986, 1991), but the general idea is that a careful account of a rational agent's capabilities would block the need for CDT, as Newcomb-type problems would not be generally feasible, and BDT would therefore always give the same prescriptions as CDT. This could be due to the fact that a rational agent acts according to her beliefs and desires—there are no further relevant causal factors to affect her decisions. To the extent that she knows her beliefs and desires, she knows all that the Predictor could know in order to predict her choices, and therefore she knows the prediction. As a consequence, she cannot find herself in a Newcomb problem, since she would not believe in the defining conditional probabilities.

But this only solves the problem by dismissing it, and makes CDT simply irrelevant, as there would be no problem in which the causal and evidential probabilities are different. Horgan admits, however, that the problem could be (implausibly) reformulated so that, say, the genetic factor in question induces in smokers a tendency to continue smoking when faced with this problem. Horgan concedes that this avoids the tickle defence, but believes that, in this case, it would actually be rational to stop smoking, even though that decision does not cause the desirable outcome.

Within a hidden-variables interpretation, the quantum scenario makes it possible to instantiate an actual Newcomb-type problem by making it impossible even in principle for an agent to know the hidden variables. If this were not the case, then where Bell violations occur, an agent could use their knowledge of the hidden variables to transmit faster-than-light signals (Cavalcanti, 2007), which could lead to the existence of inconsistent causal loops. The fact that the probabilities in a usual Newcomb scenario seem to be apparently independent of whether or not the agent could have knowledge of the causal factors speaks against the feasibility of those scenarios. Any actual instantiation of a Newcomb-type problem would probably look much more like the Bell scenario than the medical Newcomb problems. They should make it clear that those causal factors are in fact hidden as far as the agent is concerned.

6 Summary and conclusion

The main argument of this paper can be summarised as follows: (i) CDT needs some account of which events are within and outside the causal influence of an action; (ii) with this distinction in place, the causal probabilities are formally identical to a LHV model in the context of quantum mechanics; (iii) the causal decision theorist should assign some nonzero credence to the logically possible causal hypotheses listed in 4.1.4; (iv) the causal probabilities for some of those hypotheses are given by a LHV model and are thus distinct from the quantum probabilities. A game can be constructed to exploit that discrepancy, following Bell's theorem; (v) since any observation is by construction compatible with all of the causal hypotheses, repeated observation of the predicted quantum correlations cannot change the initial credences and CDT will always prescribe the losing strategy.

Perhaps this debate may also inform discussions in foundations of quantum mechanics. The fact that the debate in decision theory centres around the "statistical independence" assumption may indicate that this assumption, often taken for granted, needs more attention in the quantum debate. One way of relaxing that assumption is in terms of a kind of superdeterministic theory in which both the experimental outcomes and choices share a common cause. Another possibility is that these correlations are arranged through retrocausality. Some authors have considered this possibility as a serious alternative to the interpretation of quantum mechanics (Price, 1996; Wharton, 2007; Berkovitz, 2008; Pegg, 2008; Price, 2008), but it hasn't been given as much attention as it seems to deserve.

Decision theory has been used as the basis of a foundational program started by Deutsch (1999) and further developed by Wallace (2006; 2007) in the context of the Everett (Many-Worlds) interpretation of quantum mechanics. However, that parallel could also prove useful in attempts to understand quantum mechanics as a theory about information (Caves et al., 2002; Fuchs, 2003). One of the goals of this program is to pursue information-theoretic principles that lead one to the abstract formalism of
quantum mechanics. The discussion in this paper seems to indicate that it might be interesting for that program to consider the perspective of an agent not only as the holder of information, but as the source of decisions about observations to be performed on the world. These decisions, as far as the agent is concerned, cannot be considered to be correlated with any of their information (which experiments an agent will perform is not encoded in their quantum state assignment), but yet their observations are such that the world looks as if the outcomes of those observations were so correlated with their choices, if only they consider the general validity of local causality. Regardless of commitments about the actual existence or otherwise of hidden variables, it would be interesting to know whether these kinds of considerations can restrict the space of possible theories in an interesting way.

As topics for further research, it would be interesting to attempt to find simpler decision scenarios displaying an incompatibility between CDT and BDT within a quantum set up. A possible approach would be to use the correlations of a Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger tri-partite entangled state, which allow for non-statistical demonstrations of the incompatibility between local realism and the predictions of quantum theory, or an adapted form of the Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem.

Finally, as discussed in Section 4.1.4, if causal decision theory is the correct theory of rational decisions, then this analogy would provide a surprising practical consequence, in terms of the prescribed behaviour of rational agents, for competing causal interpretations of quantum mechanics. In other words, it would provide an observable, practical distinction between alternative metaphysical hypotheses.

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References


