Lewis, Peter J. (2009) A note on the Doomsday Argument. [Preprint]

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Abstract

I argue that advocates of the Doomsday Argument are faced with a dilemma. If they accept the thirder position regarding self-location, then the Doomsday Argument fails; knowledge of birth rank has no effect on one’s credences concerning the survival of the human species. If they accept the halfer position regarding self-location, then the Doomsday Argument fails; knowledge of birth rank may confirm smaller total human populations over larger ones, but this is not equivalent to confirmation of a shorter future for humanity, and in fact the same evidence may confirm longer future human survival over shorter.

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• A note on the Doomsday Argument. (deposited 14 Jul 2009)
  • A note on the Doomsday Argument. (deposited 13 Sep 2009)[Currently Displayed]

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