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A note on the Doomsday Argument

Lewis, Peter J. (2009) A note on the Doomsday Argument. [Preprint]

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Abstract

I argue that advocates of the Doomsday Argument are faced with a dilemma. If they accept the thirder position regarding self-location, then the Doomsday Argument fails; knowledge of birth rank has no effect on one’s credences concerning the survival of the human species. If they accept the halfer position regarding self-location, then the Doomsday Argument fails; knowledge of birth rank may confirm smaller total human populations over larger ones, but this is not equivalent to confirmation of a shorter future for humanity, and in fact the same evidence may confirm longer future human survival over shorter.


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Item Type: Preprint
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Lewis, Peter J.
Keywords: Doomsday Argument, Sleeping Beauty, confirmation, self-location.
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
Depositing User: Peter J. Lewis
Date Deposited: 13 Sep 2009
Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 15:18
Item ID: 4885
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/4885

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