PhilSci Archive

Two Conceptions of Subjective Experience

Sytsma, Justin and Machery, Edouard (2009) Two Conceptions of Subjective Experience. [Preprint]

[img] PDF

Download (354kB)


Do philosophers and ordinary people conceive of subjective experience in the same way? In this article, we argue that they do not and that the philosophical concept of phenomenal consciousness does not coincide with the folk conception. We first offer experimental support for the hypothesis that philosophers and ordinary people conceive of subjective experience in markedly different ways. We then explore experimentally the folk conception, proposing that for the folk, subjective experience is closely linked to valence. We conclude by considering the implications of our findings for a central issue in the philosophy of mind, the hard problem of consciousness.

Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Preprint
Sytsma, Justin
Machery, Edouard
Additional Information: Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies.
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
General Issues > Experimentation
Depositing User: Justin Sytsma
Date Deposited: 13 Sep 2009
Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 15:18
Item ID: 4888

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item