PhilSci Archive

Two Conceptions of Subjective Experience

Sytsma, Justin and Machery, Edouard (2009) Two Conceptions of Subjective Experience. [Preprint]

[img] PDF
Download (346Kb)

    Abstract

    Do philosophers and ordinary people conceive of subjective experience in the same way? In this article, we argue that they do not and that the philosophical concept of phenomenal consciousness does not coincide with the folk conception. We first offer experimental support for the hypothesis that philosophers and ordinary people conceive of subjective experience in markedly different ways. We then explore experimentally the folk conception, proposing that for the folk, subjective experience is closely linked to valence. We conclude by considering the implications of our findings for a central issue in the philosophy of mind, the hard problem of consciousness.


    Export/Citation:EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
    Social Networking:

    Item Type: Preprint
    Additional Information: Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies.
    Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
    General Issues > Experimentation
    Depositing User: Justin Sytsma
    Date Deposited: 13 Sep 2009
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:18
    Item ID: 4888
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/4888

    Actions (login required)

    View Item

    Document Downloads