Barrett, Jeffrey Alan (2001) Toward a Pragmatic Account of Scientific Knowledge. [Preprint]
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Abstract: C. S. Peirce's psychological analysis of belief, doubt, and inquiry provides insights into the nature of scientific knowledge. These in turn can be used to construct an account of scientific knowledge where the notions of belief, truth, rational justification, and inquiry are determined by the relationships that must hold between these notions. I will describe this account of scientific knowledge and some of the problems it faces. I will also describe the close relationship between pragmatic and naturalized accounts of scientific knowledge.
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|Keywords:||peirce, knowledge, pragmatism|
|Subjects:||General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science|
|Depositing User:||Jeffrey Barrett|
|Date Deposited:||27 Nov 2001|
|Last Modified:||07 Oct 2010 11:10|
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- Toward a Pragmatic Account of Scientific Knowledge. (deposited 07 Nov 2001)
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