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Toward a Pragmatic Account of Scientific Knowledge

Barrett, Jeffrey Alan (2001) Toward a Pragmatic Account of Scientific Knowledge. [Preprint]

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    Abstract

    Abstract: C. S. Peirce's psychological analysis of belief, doubt, and inquiry provides insights into the nature of scientific knowledge. These in turn can be used to construct an account of scientific knowledge where the notions of belief, truth, rational justification, and inquiry are determined by the relationships that must hold between these notions. I will describe this account of scientific knowledge and some of the problems it faces. I will also describe the close relationship between pragmatic and naturalized accounts of scientific knowledge.


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    Item Type: Preprint
    Keywords: peirce, knowledge, pragmatism
    Subjects: General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
    Depositing User: Jeffrey Barrett
    Date Deposited: 27 Nov 2001
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:10
    Item ID: 498
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/498

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