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Fictions, Inference, and Realism

Suarez, Mauricio (2010) Fictions, Inference, and Realism. [Preprint]

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    Abstract

    Abstract: It is often assumed without argument that fictionalism in the philosophy of science contradicts scientific realism. This paper is a critical analysis of this assumption. The kind of fictionalism that is at present discussed in philosophy of science is characterised, and distinguished from fictionalism in other areas. A distinction is then drawn between forms of fictional representation, and two competing accounts of fiction in science are discussed. I then outline explicitly what I take to be the argument for the incompatibility of scientific realism with fictionalism. I argue that some of its premises are unwarranted, and are moreover questionable from a fictionalist perspective. The conclusion is that fictionalism is neutral in the realism-antirealism debate, pulling neither in favour nor against scientific realism.


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    Item Type: Preprint
    Additional Information: Forthcoming in J. Woods (Ed.) Fictions and Models: New Essays. Philosophia Verlag, Munich, 2010.
    Keywords: Representation, Fictionalism, Models, Idealisation, Realism, Pragmatism
    Subjects: General Issues > Thought Experiments
    General Issues > Models and Idealization
    General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
    General Issues > Theory/Observation
    General Issues > Experimentation
    General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
    General Issues > Operationalism/Instrumentalism
    Depositing User: Mauricio Suárez
    Date Deposited: 08 Jan 2010
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:18
    Item ID: 5013
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/5013

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