Suárez, Mauricio (2009) Fictions, Inference, and Realism. [Preprint]
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Abstract
It is often assumed without argument that fictionalism in the philosophy of science contradicts scientific realism. This paper is a critical analysis of this assumption. The kind of fictionalism that is at present discussed in philosophy of science is characterised, and distinguished from fictionalism in other areas. A distinction is then drawn between forms of fictional representation, and two competing accounts of fiction in science are discussed. I then outline explicitly what I take to be the argument for the incompatibility of scientific realism with fictionalism. I argue that some of its premises are unwarranted, and are moreover questionable from a fictionalist perspective. The conclusion is that fictionalism is neutral in the realism-antirealism debate, pulling neither in favour nor against scientific realism.
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| Item Type: | Preprint |
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| Additional Information: | Forthcoming in J. Woods (ed.) Fictions and Models: New Essays. Philosophia Verlag, Munich, 2010. |
| Keywords: | Representation, Fictionalism, Models, Idealisation, Realism, Pragmatism |
| Subjects: | General Issues > Thought Experiments General Issues > Models and Idealization General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Theory/Observation General Issues > Experimentation General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Operationalism/Instrumentalism |
| Depositing User: | Mauricio Suárez |
| Date Deposited: | 06 Dec 2009 |
| Last Modified: | 07 Oct 2010 11:18 |
| Item ID: | 5015 |
| URI: | http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/5015 |
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