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Quantum Mechanics: From Realism to Intuitionism

Hermens, Ronnie (2009) Quantum Mechanics: From Realism to Intuitionism. UNSPECIFIED.

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    Abstract

    The interpretation of quantum mechanics has been a problem since its founding days. A large contribution to the discussion of possible interpretations of quantum mechanics is given by the so-called impossibility proofs for hidden variable models; models that allow a realist interpretation. In this thesis some of these proofs are discussed, like von Neumann’s Theorem, the Kochen-Specker Theorem and the Bell-inequalities. Some more recent developments are also investigated, like Meyer’s nullification of the Kochen-Specker Theorem, the MKC-models and Conway and Kochen’s Free Will Theorem. This last one is taken to suggest that the problems that arise for certain interpretations of quantum mechanics are not limited to realist interpretations only, but also affect certain instrumentalist interpretations. It is argued that one may arrive at a more satisfying interpretation of quantum mechanics if one adopts a logic that seems more compatible with the instrumentalist viewpoint namely, intuitionistic logic. The motivations for adopting this form of logic rather than classical logic or quantum logic are linked to some of the philosophical ideas of Bohr. In particular a new interpretation of Bohr’s notion of complementarity is proposed. Finally some possibilities are explored for linking the intuitionistic interpretation of quantum mechanics to the mathematical formalism of the theory.


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    Item Type: Other
    Subjects: Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
    Depositing User: Ronnie Hermens
    Date Deposited: 09 Dec 2009
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:18
    Item ID: 5021
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/5021

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