Tappenden, Paul (2009) Evidence and Uncertainty in Everett's Multiverse. [Preprint]
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Abstract
I endorse the view that it may be of no relevance to the acceptability of the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics as a physical theory whether or not an informed observer can be uncertain about the outcome of a quantum measurement prior to its having occurred. However, I suggest that the very possibility of post-measurement, pre-observation uncertainty has an essential role to play in both confirmation theory and decision theory in a branching universe. This is supported by arguments which do not appeal to Van Fraassen’s Reflection Principle.
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| Item Type: | Preprint |
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| Additional Information: | This is the final version of the paper which has been accepted by the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science for publication in 2010. |
| Keywords: | Everett, many-worlds, probability, personal fission |
| Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics |
| Depositing User: | paul tappenden |
| Date Deposited: | 16 Dec 2009 |
| Last Modified: | 07 Oct 2010 11:19 |
| Item ID: | 5046 |
| URI: | http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/5046 |
Available Versions of this Item
- Identity and uncertainty in Everett's multiverse. (deposited 18 Feb 2008)
- Evidence and Uncertainty in Everett's Multiverse. (deposited 16 Dec 2009)[Currently Displayed]
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