Russo, Federica and Williamson, Jon
Generic versus Single-case Causality: the Case of Autopsy.
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This paper addresses questions about how the levels of causality (generic and single-case causality) are related. One question is epistemological: can relationships at one level be evidence for relationships at the other level? We present three kinds of answer to this question, categorised according to whether inference is top-down, bottom-up, or the levels are independent. A second question is metaphysical: can relationships at one level be reduced to relationships at the other level? We present three kinds of answer to this second question, categorised according to whether single-case relations are reduced to generic, generic relations are reduced to single-case, or the levels are independent. We then explore causal inference in autopsy. This is an interesting case study, we argue, because it refutes all three epistemologies and all three metaphysics. We close by sketching an account of causality that survives autopsy--the epistemic theory.
||Causality; Causal inference; Epistemology of Causality; Metaphysics of Causality; Autopsy
||General Issues > Causation
||05 Feb 2010
||07 Oct 2010 15:19
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