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Comparing Probabilistic Measures of Explanatory Power

Schupbach, Jonah N. (2010) Comparing Probabilistic Measures of Explanatory Power. In: [2010] The Future of Philosophy of Science (Tilburg, NL; April 14-16, 2010).

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    Abstract

    Recently, in attempting to account for explanatory reasoning in probabilistic terms, Bayesians have proposed several measures of the degree to which a hypothesis explains a given set of facts. These candidate measures of "explanatory power" are shown to have interesting normative interpretations and consequences. What has not yet been investigated, however, is whether any of these measures are also descriptive of people’s actual explanatory judgments. Here, I present my own experimental work investigating this question. I argue that one measure in particular is an accurate descriptor of explanatory judgments. Then, I discuss some interesting implications of this result for both the epistemology and the psychology of explanatory reasoning.


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    Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
    Keywords: Bayesianism, Explanatory Power, Probability Theory
    Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
    General Issues > Explanation
    General Issues > Experimentation
    Conferences and Volumes: [2010] The Future of Philosophy of Science (Tilburg, NL; April 14-16, 2010)
    Depositing User: Jonah N. Schupbach
    Date Deposited: 30 Mar 2010
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:19
    Item ID: 5227
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/5227

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