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Genuine versus Deceptive Emotional Displays

Grose, Jonathan (2010) Genuine versus Deceptive Emotional Displays. In: [2009] EPSA09: 2nd Conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association (Amsterdam, 21-24 October, 2009) > EPSA 2009 Contributed Papers.

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    Abstract

    This paper contributes to the explanation of human cooperative behaviour, examining the implications of Brian Skyrms’ modelling of the prisoner’s dilemma (PD). Augmenting a PD with signalling strategies promotes cooperation, but a challenge that must be addressed is what prevents signals being subverted by deceptive behaviour. Empirical results suggest that emotional displays can play a signalling role and, to some extent, are secure from subversion. I examine proximate explanations and then offer an evolutionary explanation for the translucency of emotional displays. Selection acts on the basis of lifetime fitness consequences and, crucially for my argument, the intensity of selection decreases over the course of a lifetime. Hence we tend to possess traits that promote survival when young and, with regard to emotional displays, translucency allows successful maturation over our protracted period of nurturing by close kin. This is due to the vital role played by emotional interactions in the normal cognitive and social development of Homo sapiens.


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    Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
    Keywords: Cooperation, Signals, Emotion, Life-history theory
    Subjects: Specific Sciences > Biology > Evolutionary Theory
    Conferences and Volumes: [2009] EPSA09: 2nd Conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association (Amsterdam, 21-24 October, 2009) > EPSA 2009 Contributed Papers
    Depositing User: Jonathan Grose
    Date Deposited: 01 Apr 2010
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:19
    Item ID: 5241
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/5241

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