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Defending Underdetermination or Why the Historical Perspective Makes a Difference

Pietsch, Wolfgang (2010) Defending Underdetermination or Why the Historical Perspective Makes a Difference. In: [2009] EPSA09: 2nd Conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association (Amsterdam, 21-24 October, 2009) > EPSA 2009 Contributed Papers.

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      Abstract

      The old antagonism between the Quinean and the Duhemian view on underdetermination is reexamined. In this respect, two theses will be defended. First, it is argued that the main differences between Quine's and Duhem's versions of underdetermination derive from a different attitude towards the history of science. While Quine considered underdetermination from an ahistorical, a logical point of view, Duhem approached it as a distinguished historian of physics. On this basis, a logical and a historical version of the underdetermination thesis can be distinguished. The second thesis of the article is that the main objections against underdetermination are fatal only to the logical rendering. Taken together, the two theses constitute a defence of underdetermination.


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      Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
      Keywords: underdetermination
      Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
      General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
      General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
      Conferences and Volumes: [2009] EPSA09: 2nd Conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association (Amsterdam, 21-24 October, 2009) > EPSA 2009 Contributed Papers
      Depositing User: Wolfgang Pietsch
      Date Deposited: 01 Apr 2010
      Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:19
      Item ID: 5247
      URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/5247

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