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When do evolutionary explanations of belief debunk belief?

Griffiths, Paul and Wilkins, John (2010) When do evolutionary explanations of belief debunk belief? [Preprint]

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    Abstract

    Ever since Darwin people have worried about the sceptical implications of evolution. If our minds are products of evolution like those of other animals, why suppose that the beliefs they produce are true, rather than merely useful? In this chapter we apply this argument to beliefs in three different domains: morality, religion, and science. We identify replies to evolutionary scepticism that work in some domains but not in others. The simplest reply to evolutionary scepticism is that the truth of beliefs in a certain domain is, in fact, connected to evolutionary success, so that evolution can be expected to design systems that produce true beliefs in that domain. We call a connection between truth and evolutionary success a ‘Milvian bridge’, after the tradition which ascribes the triumph of Christianity at the battle of the Milvian bridge to the truth of Christianity. We argue that a Milvian bridge can be constructed for commonsense beliefs, and extended to scientific beliefs, but not to moral and religious beliefs. An alternative reply to evolutionary scepticism, which has been used defend moral beliefs, is to argue that their truth does not depend on their tracking some external state of affairs. We ask if this reply could be used to defend religious beliefs.


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    Item Type: Preprint
    Additional Information: Presented at "Darwin in the 21st Century"< Notre Dame, November 2009
    Keywords: evolution; religion, moral realism, epistemology; milvian bridge
    Subjects: Specific Sciences > Biology > Evolutionary Theory
    General Issues > Science and Religion
    Depositing User: John S Wilkins
    Date Deposited: 19 Apr 2010
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:19
    Item ID: 5314
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/5314

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