Discussion: Can the Best-Alternative-Justification solve Hume's Problem? On the Limits of a Promising New Approach.
In a recent Philosophy of Science article Gerhard Schurz proposes meta-inductivistic prediction strategies as a new approach to Hume's. This comment examines the limitations of Schurz's approach. It can be proven that the meta-inductivist approach does not work any more if the meta-inductivists have to face an infinite number of alternative predictors. With his limitation it remains doubtful whether the meta-inductivist can provide a full solution to the problem of induction.
||accepted (April 30th 2010) by the Philosophy of Science Journal (The accepted version does not contain chapter 2 any more, which just briefly restates the essentials of Schurz' approach - I left it in here so that the discussion note can be understood without prior reading of Schurz' paper)
||Hume's Problem, Problem of Induction, Prediction Games, Best Alternative Justification
||General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
||14 May 2010
||07 Oct 2010 15:19
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