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Discussion: Can the Best-Alternative-Justification solve Hume's Problem? On the Limits of a Promising New Approach

Arnold, Eckhart (2010) Discussion: Can the Best-Alternative-Justification solve Hume's Problem? On the Limits of a Promising New Approach. [Preprint]

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Abstract

In a recent Philosophy of Science article Gerhard Schurz proposes meta-inductivistic prediction strategies as a new approach to Hume's. This comment examines the limitations of Schurz's approach. It can be proven that the meta-inductivist approach does not work any more if the meta-inductivists have to face an infinite number of alternative predictors. With his limitation it remains doubtful whether the meta-inductivist can provide a full solution to the problem of induction.


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Item Type: Preprint
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Arnold, Eckhart
Additional Information: accepted (April 30th 2010) by the Philosophy of Science Journal (The accepted version does not contain chapter 2 any more, which just briefly restates the essentials of Schurz' approach - I left it in here so that the discussion note can be understood without prior reading of Schurz' paper)
Keywords: Hume's Problem, Problem of Induction, Prediction Games, Best Alternative Justification
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
Depositing User: Eckhart Arnold
Date Deposited: 14 May 2010
Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 15:19
Item ID: 5350
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/5350

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