PhilSci Archive

Discussion: Can the Best-Alternative-Justification solve Hume's Problem? On the Limits of a Promising New Approach

Arnold, Eckhart (2010) Discussion: Can the Best-Alternative-Justification solve Hume's Problem? On the Limits of a Promising New Approach. [Preprint]

[img]
Preview
PDF
Download (247Kb) | Preview

    Abstract

    In a recent Philosophy of Science article Gerhard Schurz proposes meta-inductivistic prediction strategies as a new approach to Hume's. This comment examines the limitations of Schurz's approach. It can be proven that the meta-inductivist approach does not work any more if the meta-inductivists have to face an infinite number of alternative predictors. With his limitation it remains doubtful whether the meta-inductivist can provide a full solution to the problem of induction.


    Export/Citation:EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
    Social Networking:

    Item Type: Preprint
    Additional Information: accepted (April 30th 2010) by the Philosophy of Science Journal (The accepted version does not contain chapter 2 any more, which just briefly restates the essentials of Schurz' approach - I left it in here so that the discussion note can be understood without prior reading of Schurz' paper)
    Keywords: Hume's Problem, Problem of Induction, Prediction Games, Best Alternative Justification
    Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
    Depositing User: Eckhart Arnold
    Date Deposited: 14 May 2010
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:19
    Item ID: 5350
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/5350

    Actions (login required)

    View Item

    Document Downloads