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On a Straw Man in the Philosophy of Science - A Defense of the Received View

Lutz, Sebastian (2010) On a Straw Man in the Philosophy of Science - A Defense of the Received View. In: [2010] British Society for the Philosophy of Science Annual Conference 2010 (Dublin; July 8-9, 2010).

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    Abstract

    I defend the Received View on scientific theories as developed by Carnap, Hempel, and Feigl against a number of criticisms based on misconceptions. First, I dispute the claim that the Received View demands axiomatizations in first order logic, and the further claim that these axiomatizations must include axioms for the mathematics used in the scientific theories. Next, I contend that models are important according to the Received View. Finally, I argue against the claim that the Received View is intended to make the concept of a theory more precise. Rather, it is meant as a generalizable framework for explicating specific theories.


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    Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
    Keywords: received view, syntactic view, semantic view, axiomatization, explication
    Subjects: General Issues > Structure of Theories
    General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
    General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
    Conferences and Volumes: [2010] British Society for the Philosophy of Science Annual Conference 2010 (Dublin; July 8-9, 2010)
    Depositing User: Sebastian Lutz
    Date Deposited: 01 Aug 2010
    Last Modified: 31 Oct 2012 21:57
    Item ID: 5497
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/5497

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