Lutz, Sebastian (2010) On a Straw Man in the Philosophy of Science - A Defense of the Received View. In: UNSPECIFIED.
I defend the Received View on scientific theories as developed by Carnap, Hempel, and Feigl against a number of criticisms based on misconceptions. First, I dispute the claim that the Received View demands axiomatizations in first order logic, and the further claim that these axiomatizations must include axioms for the mathematics used in the scientific theories. Next, I contend that models are important according to the Received View. Finally, I argue against the claim that the Received View is intended to make the concept of a theory more precise. Rather, it is meant as a generalizable framework for explicating specific theories.
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|Item Type:||Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)|
|Keywords:||received view, syntactic view, semantic view, axiomatization, explication|
|Subjects:||General Issues > Structure of Theories
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
|Depositing User:||Sebastian Lutz|
|Date Deposited:||01 Aug 2010|
|Last Modified:||01 Nov 2012 01:57|
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