PhilSci Archive

On a Straw Man in the Philosophy of Science - A Defense of the Received View

Lutz, Sebastian (2010) On a Straw Man in the Philosophy of Science - A Defense of the Received View. In: UNSPECIFIED.

WarningThere is a more recent version of this item available.
[img]
Preview
PDF
straw_man_received_view.pdf

Download (179kB)

Abstract

I defend the Received View on scientific theories as developed by Carnap, Hempel, and Feigl against a number of criticisms based on misconceptions. First, I dispute the claim that the Received View demands axiomatizations in first order logic, and the further claim that these axiomatizations must include axioms for the mathematics used in the scientific theories. Next, I contend that models are important according to the Received View. Finally, I argue against the claim that the Received View is intended to make the concept of a theory more precise. Rather, it is meant as a generalizable framework for explicating specific theories.


Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Lutz, Sebastian
Keywords: received view, syntactic view, semantic view, axiomatization, explication
Subjects: General Issues > Structure of Theories
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
Depositing User: Sebastian Lutz
Date Deposited: 01 Aug 2010
Last Modified: 01 Nov 2012 01:57
Item ID: 5497
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/5497

Available Versions of this Item

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item