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Is Emotion a Natural Kind?

Griffiths, Paul (2002) Is Emotion a Natural Kind? [Preprint]

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    In <i>What Emotions Really Are: The problem of psychological categories<i> I argued that it is unlikely that all the psychological states and processes that fall under the vernacular category of emotion are sufficiently similar to one another to allow a unified scientific psychology of the emotions. In this paper I restate what I mean by natural kind and my argument for supposing that emotion is not a natural kind in this specific sense. In the following sections I discuss the two most promising proposals to reunify the emotion category: the revival of the Jamesian theory of emotion associated with the writings of Antonio Damasio and a philosophical approach to the content of emotional representations that draws on multi-level appraisal theory in psychology.

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    Item Type: Preprint
    Keywords: emotion natural kinds damasio somatic appraisal nussbaum appraisal theory
    Subjects: Specific Sciences > Biology > Evolutionary Psychology
    Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
    Specific Sciences > Psychology/Psychiatry
    Depositing User: Professor Paul Edmund Griffiths
    Date Deposited: 19 Nov 2002
    Last Modified: 13 Sep 2015 11:03
    Item ID: 566

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