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The Doomsday Argument Without Knowledge of Birth Rank

Monton, Bradley (2001) The Doomsday Argument Without Knowledge of Birth Rank. [Preprint]

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    Abstract

    The Carter-Leslie Doomsday argument, as standardly presented, relies on the assumption that you have knowledge of your approximate birth rank. I demonstrate that the Doomsday argument can still be given in a situation where you have no knowledge of your birth rank. This allows one to reply to Bostrom's defense of the Doomsday argument against the refutation based on the idea that your existence makes it more likely that many observers exist.


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    Item Type: Preprint
    Keywords: Doomsday argument, anthropic reasoning, observational selection effects, problem of old evidence
    Subjects: General Issues > Decision Theory
    Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
    Depositing User: Bradley Monton
    Date Deposited: 08 Mar 2002
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:10
    Item ID: 577
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/577

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