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Presentism and Quantum Gravity

Monton, Bradley (2001) Presentism and Quantum Gravity. [Preprint]

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    Abstract

    There is a philosophical tradition of arguing against presentism, the thesis that only presently existing things exist, on the basis of its incompatibility with fundamental physics. I grant that presentism is incompatible with special and general relativity, but argue that presentism is not incompatible with quantum gravity, because there are some theories of quantum gravity that utilize a fixed foliation of spacetime. I reply to various objections to this defense of presentism, and point out a flaw in Gödel's modal argument for the ideality of time. This paper provides an interesting case study of the interplay between physics and philosophy.


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    Item Type: Preprint
    Keywords: presentism, quantum gravity
    Subjects: Specific Sciences > Physics > Cosmology
    Specific Sciences > Physics > Relativity Theory
    Depositing User: Bradley Monton
    Date Deposited: 26 Mar 2002
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:10
    Item ID: 591
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/591

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