Everett and Structure

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I address the problem of indefiniteness in quantum mechanics: the problem that the theory, without changes to its formalism, seems to predict that macroscopic quantities have no definite values. The Everett interpretation is often criticised along these lines and I shall argue that much of this criticism rests on a false dichotomy: that the macroworld must either be written directly into the formalism or be regarded as somehow illusory. By means of analogy with other areas of physics, I develop the view that the macroworld is instead to be understood in terms of certain structures and patterns which emerge from quantum theory (given appropriate dynamics, in particular decoherence). I extend this view to the observer, and in doing so make contact with functionalist theories of mind.

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1 The measurement problem

A simple way to think about the quantum measurement problem is as follows:

1. The formalism of quantum mechanics describes the evolution of a mathematical object called the wave-function. By analogy with classical physics, the natural move is to treat this wave-function as directly representing a real thing, making it analogous to the phase-space point representing a set of particles, or to the vector field representing a state of the electromagnetic field. (The alternative of treating the wave-function as some sort of probability distribution — analogously to classical statistical mechanics — turns out to be untenable, at least without further modification of the theory.1)

1There is a ‘statistical’ or ‘ensemble’ interpretation of quantum mechanics, discussed by (for instance) Ballentine (1990) and Taylor (1986), which does attempt to take the wave-function as just giving the statistical distribution of outcomes from a large number of measurements; I find it difficult to see how this interpretation manages to avoid both commitment to some unknown hidden-variables theory on the one-hand, or outright anti-realism on the other, but this is not the place for such a debate.

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2. Taking this view of the wave-function when it is used to describe microscopic objects like atoms or molecules leads us to the conclusion that these objects often do not have definite values of properties — such as spin or position — which classically we would expect to be definite. This ‘superposition’ of properties implies a very weird view of the microworld, but since that world is not directly observable such weirdness is not (yet) a problem.\footnote{At least, there is no epistemic problem; however, it might be argued that — pending an understanding of what (for instance) indefiniteness of position actually means — our theory is simply incoherent as a physical theory. This suggests, as argued recently by Tappenden (2000, 2002), that we may need to introduce “many-worlds” talk at the microphysical level, before any consideration of macroscopic ontology. For my own attempt to develop this approach without having to change the quantum-mechanical formalism, see Wallace (2001b).}

3. However, the detailed dynamics of the quantum wavefunction (specifically, linearity and entanglement) imply that this microscopic indefiniteness inevitably leads to indefiniteness at the everyday level — so that pointers sometimes do not have definite positions, and cats sometimes are not definitely alive or dead. This is not merely “weird” but apparently pathological.

At first sight, the obvious move seems to be to modify the theory itself: to change either the dynamics, or the assumption that reality is fully represented by the wave-function. Everett’s contribution to the debate was to challenge this ‘obvious’ strategy and to take seriously the idea of superpositions at the macroscopic level. The gain of doing so would be significant: the simple and elegant mathematical structure of quantum theory would be left intact; there would be no need to postulate ad hoc modifications of the dynamics, no need to add extra elements to the theory which play no part in its practical applications, and no conflict with relativity.

But Everett’s strategy must obviously overcome major problems. The idea of an indeterminate macroworld seems either meaningless or just plain contradicted by observations: what could it mean to say objects have indefinite position? And even if it does mean anything, surely you only have to look at them to see that their positions are definite?

The goal of this paper is to show how these problems can be resolved, without compromising the mathematical structure of quantum theory. The approach which I shall advocate is based upon decoherence theory, and very much upon the lines of the recent versions of the Everett interpretation proposed by Gell-Mann and Hartle (1990), Saunders (1998), Zurek (1998), and others; in section 2 I contrast this sort of approach to Everett with earlier versions which modify the mathematical formalism or introduce an explicit role for consciousness. In section 3 I shall argue that the conceptual criticisms of the decoherence-based approach (I don’t discuss the more technical objections) are based upon a false dichotomy (that either the macroscopic world is written directly into the quantum formalism or it is simply an illusion), and in section 4 I shall defend a view of macroscopic objects which avoids this dichotomy, based on work by Dennett.
(primarily Dennett 1991b). In sections 5–7 I apply this view to quantum mechanics, first to Schrödinger’s cat and then, in section 7, to human observers. In the latter section I will make contact with the functionalist program in philosophy of mind, which fits very naturally into my framework; at the end of the section I briefly discuss the problem of probability in Everett interpretations, although for the most part I treat probability as a separate foundational problem lying largely outside the scope of this paper.

2 Recovering macroscopic definiteness

Traditionally there have been two approaches taken to avoiding the problems of macroscopic indefiniteness mentioned above, whilst preserving the attractive features of Everett’s strategy; these are now usually referred to as the “Many Worlds” and “Many Minds” interpretations. Both approaches begin with some superposition like

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \left( |\text{atom decayed}\rangle \otimes |\text{counter triggered}\rangle \otimes |\text{observer detects decay}\rangle + |\text{atom undecayed}\rangle \otimes |\text{counter not triggered}\rangle \otimes |\text{observer detects no decay}\rangle \right)$$

which prima facie is an indefinite state in which neither the detection apparatus nor the observer are definite. The many-worlds strategy interprets the two terms in this superposition as representing two (or possibly two families of) distinct macroscopic worlds — hence the universal state represents a multiplicity of worlds, each one of which is macroscopically definite.

The many-minds strategy, on the other hand, accepts that (1) is indefinite, and attempts to recover not definiteness but just the appearance of definiteness. This is done by associating different mental phenomena to each of the “observer” terms in (1), so that associated with each (macroscopically indefinite) brain is a large number of definite minds. Each mind sees one term in the superposition, so that to the minds the world appears definite even though it is not.

However, in both of these approaches, it seems that we have to add something to the underlying theory. In the many-worlds case we seem to have to specify a particular Hilbert-space basis (the so-called “preferred basis”) to define worlds, and to explain why the wave-function is to be decomposed in one way rather than another. Also, if the world-decomposition is defined in terms of a basis then there would seem to be no fact of the matter as to which world at time $t_2$ is identical to (or the successor of, etc.) a given world at time $t_1$. This creates pressure to add another piece of structure, some sort of “connection rule” linking up worlds across time.3

Arguably (and controversially! — see Lockwood (1996) for a defence) many-minds theories avoid the need to add a preferred basis to the quantum for-
ism, but they do so at the price of requiring a very close connection between fundamental physics and the philosophy of mind — effectively transferring the problem of selecting a basis onto our theory of mind and requiring that theory to be explicitly quantum-mechanical. The requirement for a “connection rule” to handle transtemporal identity seems just as strong for many-minds theories as for many-worlds theories: how are we to link up definite experiences at time $t_1$ with those at time $t_2$?

Theories can be constructed which provide this extra structure (a number are discussed in Barrett 1999) but the additions to the formalism seem to count against the very reasons which led us to consider Everett’s strategy in the first place: the new structure is ad hoc in the sense that it is usually quite underdetermined by observable data, and almost inevitably spoils the relativistic covariance of the theory.

From the 1980s onwards, decoherence theory has often been cited as part of the solution to this problem of definiteness. The technical details of this approach shall not concern us here, but the basic idea is that dynamical processes cause a preferred basis to emerge rather than having to be specified a priori — here we can understand ‘emerge’ in the sense that interference between processes described by separate terms of the preferred basis is negligible. (See Zurek 1991 for details.)

Two sorts of objection can be raised against the decoherence approach to definiteness. The first is purely technical: will decoherence really lead to a preferred basis in physically realistic situations, and will that preferred basis be one in which macroscopic objects have at least approximate definiteness? Evaluating the progress made in establishing this would be beyond the scope of this paper, but there is good reason to be optimistic.

The other sort of objection is more conceptual in nature: it is the claim that even if the technical success of the decoherence program is assumed, it will not be enough to solve the problem of indefiniteness. This is because the decoherence process is only approximate: the preferred basis is very accurately specified but not given exactly, and the interference between terms, though very small, is not zero. Furthermore, for this reason the program does not apparently help with the problem of giving an exact criterion for transtemporal identity.

It is this second, conceptual, objection that I wish to address in the remainder of this paper.

3 The fallacy of exactness

The objection above arises from a view implicit in much discussion of Everett-style interpretations: that certain concepts and objects in quantum mechanics must either enter the theory formally in its axiomatic structure, or be regarded as illusions. Consider, for instance, Kent’s influential (1990) critique of Many-Worlds interpretations:

It’s certainly true that phase information loss is a dynamical process which needs no axiomatic formulation. However, this is irrelevant to our very simple point: no preferred basis can arise, from the
dynamics or from anything else, unless some basis selection rule is given. Of course, [Many-Worlds Interpretation] proponents can attempt to frame such a rule in terms of a dynamical quantity - for example, some measure of phase information loss. But an explicit, precise rule is needed. (p.11; page numbering refers to the internet version.)

In other words, a preferred basis must either be written into the quantum-mechanical axioms, or no such basis can exist — the idea of some approximate, emergent preferred basis is not acceptable. The paper goes on to make a similar point about ‘worlds’:

...one can perhaps intuitively view the corresponding components [of the wave function] as describing a pair of independent worlds. But this intuitive interpretation goes beyond what the axioms justify: the axioms say nothing about the existence of multiple physical worlds corresponding to wave function components. (p.11)

Analogous objections are raised about transtemporal identity: Barrett’s recent (1999) book gives an example.

In so far as one lacks a notion of the identity of a world over time (and thus, no notion of the identity of an observer over time), the splitting-worlds theory is thus empirically incoherent... But if one adds a connection rule to the theory, then this further (because one also needs to chose a preferred basis) detracts from the theory’s simplicity. (p.162)

Barrett’s quote implies that we face the same dichotomy: either there is some precise truth about transtemporal identity which must written into the basic formalism of quantum mechanics, or there are simply no facts at all about the past of a given world, or a given observer. (This seems to be what motivates Bell (1981) to say that in the Everett interpretation the past is an illusion.)

I will argue that in defending any worthwhile version of the Everett interpretation, we should reject this view. My claim is instead that the emergence of a classical world from quantum mechanics is to be understood in terms of the emergence from the theory of certain sorts of structures and patterns, and that this means that we have no need (as well as no hope!) of the precision which Kent and others here demand.

Before developing this account, I shall briefly address what might appear to be a looming threat to any such approach. The problem of macroscopic indefiniteness is (in part) how we can understand the quantum state as simultaneously describing two macro-objects (A and B, say) with contradictory properties (such as being an alive cat, versus being a dead one). Introducing ‘many worlds’ at the level of formalism, for all its disadvantages, certainly solves this problem, for then A and B are simply distinct objects. If however, we adopt any account in which A and B each supervene on properties of the micro-world’s ontology (say, P and Q), then if A and B have contradictory properties then surely P
and Q must themselves be contradictory, and to avoid incoherence we appear to be forced back onto the explicit introduction of ‘many worlds’ at the level of the micro-ontology.

There is a flaw in this argument, however. If A and B have contradictory properties then P and Q must certainly be different properties, but it does not follow that they should have to be contradictory. The underlying micro-ontology is (faithfully represented by) the quantum state, and that state has a far richer set of properties than any classical state (as can be seen, for instance, from a position-basis viewpoint, where the quantum state of the Universe is represented as a function over an enormously high-dimensional configuration space, rather than the paltry three dimensions over which any classical field is defined). If A and B are to be ‘live cat’ and ‘dead cat’ then P and Q will be described by statements about the state vector which (expressed in a position basis) will concern the wave-function’s amplitude in vastly separated regions $R_P$ and $R_Q$ of configuration space, and there will be no contradiction between these statements.

4 Understanding higher-order ontology

To see why it is reasonable to reject the dichotomy of the previous section, consider that in science there are many examples of objects which are certainly real, but which are not directly represented in the axioms. A dramatic example of such an object is the tiger: tigers are unquestionably real in any reasonable sense of the word, but they are certainly not part of the basic ontology of any physical theory. A tiger, instead, is to be understood as a pattern or structure in the physical state.

To see how this works in practice, consider how we could go about studying, say, tiger hunting patterns. In principle — but only in principle — the most reliable way to make predictions about these would be in terms of atoms and electrons, applying molecular dynamics directly to the swirl of molecules which make up tigers and their environment. In practice, however, this is clearly insane: no remotely imaginable computer would be able to solve the $10^{35}$ or so simultaneous dynamical equations which would be needed to predict what the tigers would do, and even if such a computer could exist its calculations could not remotely be said to explain their behaviour.

A more effective strategy can be found by studying the structures observable at the multi-trillion-molecule level of description of this ‘swirl of molecules’. At this level, we will observe robust — though not 100% reliable — regularities, which will give us an alternative description of the tiger in a language of cells and molecules. The principles by which these cells and molecules interact will be derivable from the underlying microphysics, and will involve various assumptions and approximations; hence very occasionally they will be found to fail. Nonetheless, this slight riskiness in our description is overwhelmingly worthwhile given the enormous gain in usefulness of this new description: the language of cell biology is both explanatorily far more powerful, and practically far more useful, than the language of physics for describing tiger behaviour.
Nonetheless it is still ludicrously hard work to study tigers in this way. To reach a really practical level of description, we again look for patterns and regularities, this time in the behaviour of the cells that make up individual tigers (and other living creatures which interact with them). In doing so we will reach yet another language, that of zoology and evolutionary adaptationism, which describes the system in terms of tigers, deer, grass, camouflage and so on. This language is, of course, the norm in studying tiger hunting patterns, and another (in practice very modest) increase in the riskiness of our description is happily accepted in exchange for another phenomenal rise in explanatory power and practical utility.

Of course, talk of zoology is grounded in cell biology, and cell biology in molecular physics, but we cannot discard the tools and terms of zoology to work directly with physics, without (a) losing explanatory power, and (b) taking forever.

What moral should we draw from this mildly fanciful example? That higher-level ontology is to be understood in terms of pattern or structure: in a slogan,

*A tiger is any pattern which behaves as a tiger.*

More precisely, what we have is a criterion for which patterns are to be regarded as real, which we might call Dennett’s criterion (in recognition of a very similar view proposed by Dennett 1991b).

**Dennett’s Criterion:** A macro-object is a pattern, and the existence of a pattern as a real thing depends on the usefulness — in particular, the explanatory power and predictive reliability — of theories which admit that pattern in their ontology.

Dennett’s own favourite example is worth describing briefly in order to show the ubiquity of this way of thinking: if I have a computer running a chess program, I can in principle predict its next move by analysing the electrical flow through its circuitry, but I have no chance of doing this in practice, and anyway it will give me virtually no understanding of that move. I can achieve a vastly more effective method of predictions if I know the program and am prepared to take the (very small) risk that it is not being correctly implemented by the computer, but even this method will be practically very difficult to use. One more vast improvement can be gained if I don’t concern myself with the details of the program, but simply assume that whatever they are, they cause the computer to play good chess. Thus I move successively from a language of electrons and silicon chips, through one of program steps, to one of intentions, beliefs, plans and so forth — each time trading a small increase in risk for an enormous increase in predictive and explanatory power.\(^4\)

\(^4\)A more restricted proposal of this sort (applying specifically to intentional systems, such as the chess computer example given here) was made by Dennett significantly earlier, in Dennett (1971). Though the more general view is implicit in many of Dennett’s earlier writings it does not seem to have been states explicitly prior to the (1991b) paper I cite.

\(^5\)It is, of course, highly contentious to suppose that a chess-playing computer really believes,
Why is it reasonable to claim, in examples like these, that higher-level descriptions are *explanatorily* more powerful than lower-level ones? In other words, granted that a prediction from microphysics is in practice impossible, if we had such a prediction why wouldn’t it count as a good explanation? To some extent I’m inclined to say that this is just obvious — anyone who really believes that a description of the trajectories followed by the molecular constituents of a tiger explains why that tiger eats a deer means something very different by ‘explanation’. But possibly a more satisfying reason is that the higher-level theory to some extent ‘floats free’ of the lower-level one, in the sense that it doesn’t care how its patterns are instantiated provided that they are instantiated. (Hence a zoological account of tigers requires us to assume that they are carnivorous, have certain strengths and weaknesses, and so on, but doesn’t care what their internal makeup is.) So an explanation in terms of the lower-level theory contains an enormous amount of extraneous noise which is irrelevant to a description in terms of higher-level patterns. See Putnam (1975) for further description of this point.

This approach to higher-order ontology applies to physics itself as well as to theories other than physics, as illustrated by one further example: that of quasi-particles. To understand these, consider vibrations in a (quantum-mechanical) crystal. These can in principle be described entirely in terms of the individual crystal atoms and their quantum entanglement with one another — but it turns out to be overwhelmingly more useful to think in terms of ‘phonons’ i.e. collective excitations of the crystal which behave like ‘real’ particles in most respects.

This sort of thing is ubiquitous in solid-state physics, and the collective excitations are called ‘quasi-particles’ — so crystal vibrations are described in terms of phonons, waves in the magnetisation direction of a ferromagnet in terms of magnons, collective electron waves in a plasma in terms of plasmons, and so on. But are quasi-particles real? Well, they can be created and annihilated; they can be detected (by, for instance, scattering them off ‘real’ particles like neutrons); in some cases (such as so-called ‘ballistic’ phonons) their time-of-flight can be measured; and they play a crucial explanatory role in solid-state theories.\(^6\) We have no more evidence than this that ‘real’ particles exist, so it seems absurd to deny the existence of the quasi-particles.

But when *exactly*, you might ask, are quasi-particles present? This question has no precise answer. It is essential in a quasi-particle formulation of a solid-state problem\(^7\) that the quasi-particles decay only slowly relative to other relevant timescales (such as their time-of-flight) and when this criterion (and similar ones) are easily met then quasi-particles are definitely present. When

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\(^6\)Any solid-state textbook is replete with explanations of empirical phenomena which are couched in terms of quasi-particles; see Kittel and Fong (1987), for instance.

\(^7\)See the first chapter of Abrikosov, Gorkov, and Dzyaloshinskii (1963) for a discussion.
the decay rate is much too high, the quasi-particles decay too rapidly to behave in any ‘particulate’ way, and the description becomes useless: hence we conclude that no quasi-particles are present. However, clearly it is a mistake to ask *exactly* when the decay time is short enough (2.54 × the interaction time?) for quasi-particles not to be present. What actually happens is that, as we lower the decay time, the quasi-particle description becomes less and less advantageous compared to a lower-level description in terms of crystal atoms — hence by Dennett’s criterion it becomes less and less viable to regard them as real, until ultimately they are clearly no longer of any use in studying the crystal and we must either revert to the underlying description or look for another, more useful higher-level distinction. But the somewhat blurred borderline between states where quasi-particles exist and states where they don’t should not undermine the status of the quasi-particles as real — any more than the absence of a precise point where a valley stops and a mountain begins should undermine the status of the mountain as real.

(In fact, although this account of quasi-particles represents them as structures in an ontology of ‘real’ particles, the description in terms of nonrelativistic particle mechanics is itself effective, and derives from a description in terms of quantum field theory — there is every reason to believe particles like quarks and electrons to be patterns in the underlying quantum field in almost exactly the same sense that quasi-particles are patterns in the underlying crystal. It is interesting to ask whether the existence of *some* underlying ‘stuff’ is essential, or whether we can continue this chain of theories forever; such a question lies beyond the scope of this paper, though.)

This view of higher-order ontology as pattern or structure has some consequences which, though obvious given the nature of patterns, will play an important role in the later discussion of quantum mechanics.

1. Patterns can be imprecise. As the quasi-particle example should illustrate, a pattern can tolerate a certain amount of ‘noise’ or imprecision whilst still remaining the same pattern. (A tiger which loses a hair is still the same tiger). Beyond a certain point the noise is such that the pattern can no longer be said to be present, but there is no reason to expect there to be any precise point where this occurs. (It may sometimes be convenient to define such a point by fiat: the biologist sometimes introduces an exact moment when one species becomes another; the astrophysicist defines an exact radius at which the sun’s atmosphere starts. But neither believes that any deep truth is captured by this exactness.)

2. Patterns may involve dynamics, or be temporally extended. A ‘pattern’ in the sense I am using it need not be realised at an instant, but may depend on the behaviour over some timescale of the constituents of a pattern - what distinguishes a tiger from an inanimate facsimile of one is the behaviour of the former, not its shape.

3. There is a concept of transtemporal identity for patterns, but again it is only approximate. To say that a pattern $P_2$ at time $t_2$ is the same
pattern as some pattern $P_1$ at time $t_1$ is to say something like “$P_2$ is causally determined largely by $P_1$ and there is a continuous sequence of gradually changing patterns between them” — but this concept will not be fundamental or exact and may sometimes break down.

Before ending this section, I should acknowledge that my account is obviously linked to the topic of how one theory can emerge from, or be reduced to, another — and that this latter topic is highly controversial. Space does not permit any detailed engagement with the extensive literature on the subject, but I give here a few recent references: Butterfield and Isham (1999) give a general discussion of emergence using time in quantum gravity as an example; Thalos (1998) discusses the tension between physics and ‘higher-level’ sciences, in the context of social science, and Auyang (1998) is concerned with the way in which complex behaviour emerges from the interaction of simple systems; she uses quasi-particles as an example, in fact. There is also some overlap with the current debate on structural realism (proposed originally by Worrall (1989), developed by, e.g., Ladyman (1998), and criticised by, e.g., Psillos (1995)).

5 Quantum theory in structural terms

In order to show how the ideas of the last section apply to quantum mechanics, we consider the time-honoured problem of Schrödinger’s cat. Recall the situation: our unfortunate cat is locked in a box and at some time — let us say noon — an unstable atomic nucleus is measured by a device within the box. If the device finds the atom to be undecayed the cat lives, but if it finds that it is decayed then poison gas is released into the box. If the atom’s state is indefinite just before the measurement, then so is the cat’s state just after the measurement.

Now, suppose that the cat is put into the box at 11am and we are asked to predict what happens to it in the next hour. We do not know the wavefunction of the cat at this point, and even if we did know it exactly it would be of little use to us, for we cannot possibly solve the Schrödinger equation for such a complicated system — nor can we even solve some sort of classical or semiclassical approximation to it.

Nonetheless we can say useful things about the cat:

• from solid-state physics we can predict that the cat won’t spontaneously vaporize;
• from animal physiology we can predict that the cat won’t spontaneously die or grow a second tail;
• from cat psychology we can predict that the cat won’t start eating itself, and will probably remain asleep for the whole hour.

It is because of the power of this cat-level description to tell us about the future evolution of the wave-function, and because of the unavoidable need to work at cat-level in considering that future evolution, that we say — via Dennett’s criterion — that there is a cat present in the system.
Now consider the evolution of the system after twelve noon, when the measurement is made, but suppose that the atomic nucleus, instead of being in an indefinite state, either definitely did or definitely did not decay. In each case, to predict the system’s behaviour in the next hour, we use exactly the same methods — e.g., if the cylinder of poison gas breaks, then cat psychology tells us that the cat will probably jump backwards, and animal physiology tells us that it will die and in due course start to decompose.

Now, quantum mechanics is linear. If we know what happens if the atom definitely does, or definitely does not, decay, then we can predict what happens if we have a superposition of decaying and not decaying. However, in doing so we are using exactly the same methods as before: we are taking advantage of the patterns present in the two branches of the wave-function. In other words — and this is the crucial point — in each of the branches there is a ‘cat’ pattern, whose salience as a real thing is secured by its crucial explanatory and predictive role. Therefore, by Dennett’s criterion there is a cat present in both branches after measurement.8

Is it the same cat? Well, it is a future version of the same cat, in the sense described in the previous section: i.e., it is a pattern causally determined by the original cat and linked to it by a continuously changing sequence of cat patterns. It’s really just a matter of terminology whether we decide that the whole branching set of living and dead cats ‘is the same cat’ (as defended in Tappenden 2000); the point to be learned, though, is that when describing patterns we shouldn’t expect any more from transtemporal identity than approximate, ‘effective’ concepts which sometimes break down. (See Wallace (2001b) for further discussion of identity over time in quantum mechanics.)

Another question which at first sight should have a precise answer: if there was one cat before the measurement and two after it, when exactly did the duplication of cats occur? But first sight is mistaken. Before the decay there is certainly one cat. When the measurement occurs we will have a coherent superposition of both measurement outcomes — but after a very short time decoherence will remove the interference between these branches, and after this time there will be two cats present. During the decoherence period the wave-function is best regarded as some sort of ‘quantum soup’ which does not lend itself to a classical description — but since the decoherence timescale \( \tau_D \) is incredibly short compared to any timescale relevant at the cat level of description, this need not worry us. Put another way, the cat description is only useful when answering questions on timescales far longer than \( \tau_D \), so whether or not quantum splitting is occurring, it just doesn’t make sense to ask questions about cats that depend on such short timescales.

8If there are two cats, didn’t the mass of the universe just increase? It is easy to see mathematically that this is not the case: the mass of the universe is a property of the universal state, given by the expectation value of some ‘mass operator’ relative to that state. As such, although we can quite happily talk about mass within a given branch, mass is simply not additive across branches — any more than a superposition of two states each with energy \( E \) does not have energy \( 2E \). Analogously, a cat may have mass \( m \) in the morning and mass \( m \) in the afternoon but the cat (regarded as a temporally extended object) still only has mass \( m \), not \( m + m \). (I am grateful to Simon Saunders for this analogy.)
6 Superpositions of patterns

To see in a different way how the ideas of Sections 4-5 resolve the problem of macroscopic indefiniteness, consider the following sketch of the problem.

1. After the experiment, there is a linear superposition of a live cat and a dead cat.
2. Therefore, after the experiment the cat is in a linear superposition of being alive and being dead.
3. Therefore, the macroscopic state of the cat is indefinite.
4. This is either meaningless or refuted by experiment.

But (1) does not imply (2). The belief that it does is based upon an oversimplified view of the quantum formalism, in which there is a Hilbert space of cat states such that any vector in the space is a possible state of the cat. This is superficially plausible in view of the way that we treat microscopic subsystems: an electron or proton, for instance, is certainly understood this way, and any superposition of electron states is another electron state.

But any state of a cat is actually a member of a Hilbert space containing states representing all possible macroscopic objects made out of the cat’s subatomic constituents. Because of Dennett’s criterion, this includes states which describe

- a live cat;
- a dead cat;
- a dead dog;
- this paper . . .

We can say (if we want, and within nonrelativistic quantum mechanics) that the particles which used to make up the cat are now jointly in a linear superposition of being a live cat and being a dead cat. But cats themselves are not the sort of things which can be in superpositions. Cats are by definition “patterns which behave like cats”, and there are definitely two such patterns in the superposition.

The point can be made more generally:

It makes sense to consider a superposition of patterns, but it is just meaningless to speak of a given pattern as being in a superposition.

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9 The situation is much more complicated in quantum field theory, where the particles emerge in an effective way themselves and where particle number is not conserved. The only exactly definable subsystem would be the field degrees of freedom in the spatial vicinity of the cat, but this fails to allow for the fact that the cat might move out of that region. In QFT even more than NRQM we are forced to a pattern concept of macroscopic systems.
Thus, a pattern view of macroscopic ontology essentially solves the problem of indefiniteness by replacing indefiniteness with multiplicity; since it does so at the level of macroscopic objects including inanimate ones, it is closer in spirit to a Many-Worlds approach than to a Many-Minds one. However, this multiplication of patterns happens naturally within the existing formalism, and does not need to be added explicitly to the formalism.

It is important to remain clear what macro-objects are patterns in: they are not patterns in the positions of micro-objects, or in fundamental fields; they are patterns in (the properties of) the quantum state. As mentioned in the footnote on page 2, we can and do remain neutral about how this state is itself to be interpreted, since all we need from it are its structural properties, such as: what its representation is in the eigenbasis of a given operator. Of course, without specification of some set of preferred operators the state is structureless (we can say that it is a vector of unit norm in a countably-infinite-dimensional complex Hilbert space, but that’s about it). The details of this specification depend on the particular quantum theory with which we are working: in non-relativistic quantum mechanics, for instance, they are given by the generators of the Gallilei group for individual particles, whilst in quantum field theory they are given in terms of the map between spacetime regions and operator algebras (see Wallace (2001a, section 2.2) for a discussion).

As an aside, the analysis of this paper gives support to Deutsch’s claim that the de Broglie-Bohm pilot-wave theory (Bohm 1952; Holland 1993) and its variants are “parallel-universes theories in a state of chronic denial” (Deutsch 1996). In such theories the wave-function is supplemented by a collection of ‘corpuscles’, particles guided by the wave-function and supposed to define our observed universe. But to predict the behaviour of the corpuscles we have to predict the behaviour of the wave-function, and to predict the behaviour of the wave-function we have to study the emergent patterns within it. Thus cats and all other macro-objects can be identified in the structure of the wave-function just as in the structure of the corpuscles. But the patterns which define them are present even in those parts of the wave-function which are very remote from the corpuscles. So if we accept a structural characterisation of macroscopic reality, we must accept the multiplicity of that reality in the de Broglie-Bohm pilot wave as much as in the Everettian universal state.

7 The role of the observer

We have not yet considered explicitly how observers are to fit into the framework just described. However, if we are happy to extend Dennett’s criterion to conscious observers, then they fit into the framework quite straightforwardly: if a tiger is any pattern which behaves like a tiger, then an observer is any pattern which behaves like an observer.

\footnote{I confine my attention here to those versions of the pilot-wave theory in which the wave-function is taken to be physically real. Those versions in which only the corpuscles exist are, in my view, in even greater denial, but I shall not argue the point here. (See Wallace (forthcoming) for a discussion).}
This is essentially an expression of an established viewpoint in the philosophy of mind: functionalism. Though there are many versions of functionalism, for our purposes we can define it as follows.

**The functionalist claim:** As a matter of conceptual necessity, mental properties are supervenient on structural and functional properties of physical systems, and on no other properties. Hence, it doesn’t matter what a brain is made of, only how it works.

Functionalism is at the root of the artificial intelligence project, for it entails that any sufficiently accurate computer simulation of a conscious being will itself be conscious. I will not attempt to defend it here, but will simply explore its implications for quantum theory.\footnote{See Lewis (1966) and Armstrong (1968) for two classic defences of functionalism; Dennett (1991a) for a more recent defence; Block (1980), Chalmers (1996), Penrose (1989) and Searle (1980) for a variety of criticisms; and Hofstadter and Dennett (1981) for a collection of articles against and (mostly) for functionalism.}

Given functionalism, we can see that quantum mechanics implies the multiplication of observers in just the same way as it does the multiplicity of cats. To see this in rather more detail, let us consider an idealised measurement of some 2-state system: the system is assumed to be measured in some basis \((|1\rangle, |2\rangle)\). First consider the case where the 2-state system is actually in state \(|1\rangle\), then the observer’s state will remain definite after the measurement. Let’s suppose the joint state of 2-state system and observer some time \(t\) after the measurement is

\[
|\psi_t; 1\rangle = |1\rangle \otimes |f_1(t)\rangle, \tag{2}
\]

where \(f_1(t)\) is some functional process describing the observer in the time following his observation of \(|1\rangle\), and \(|f_1(t)\rangle\) (for varying \(t\)) is the sequence of states realising that process. Similarly if the 2-state system is actually in state \(|2\rangle\), the joint state post-measurement will be

\[
|\psi_t; 2\rangle = |2\rangle \otimes |f_2(t)\rangle. \tag{3}
\]

In accordance with comment (2) above, the states \(|f_1(t)\rangle\) and \(|f_2(t)\rangle\) describe not just the observer, but an entire macroscopic region (where objects in that region are defined in structural terms, as explained above).

Now let the 2-state system be in some superposition \(\alpha |1\rangle + \beta |2\rangle\). Linearity tells us that the overall state at time \(t\) must be

\[
|\psi_t\rangle = \alpha |1\rangle \otimes |f_1(t)\rangle + \beta |2\rangle \otimes |f_2(t)\rangle. \tag{4}
\]

\footnote{The phrase ‘conceptual necessity’ is supposed to indicate that, according to functionalism, mental properties are to be understood as by definition being present in systems with certain functional properties. We can distinguish this from the weaker claim that, in fact, mental properties are present in a system if and only if that system has certain functional properties; much of what I will say goes through in this case also. See Chalmers (1996) for a recent presentation of this weaker claim.}
one observer in an indefinite state — whatever that might mean), and we have
again replaced superposition by multiplicity.\textsuperscript{13}

We can see, then, that worries about observers with indefinite mental states
are as misplaced as worries about cats which are indefinitely alive or dead.
Patterns are not superposed, but duplicated, by the measurement event, and
ultimately we are regarding mental states as just special sorts of patterns (al-
though these patterns need not be \textit{visual} patterns, realised in the instantaneous
physical state; rather, they are likely to be \textit{behavioural} patterns, which describe
regularities in the dynamics of the physical state as well as its instantaneous
configuration — c.f. Dennett 1991b.)

We can also consider how our observer views the measurement event. In the
cases where the state of the system being observed had been definitely either
$|1\rangle$ or $|2\rangle$, the observer’s pre-measurement process ($f_0(t)$, let us say) would have
changed unproblematically into $f_1(t)$ or $f_2(t)$, and the observer would certainly
interpret this as personal survival: hence $f_0(t)$ and $f_i(t)$ describe the same
person. It is then legitimate for the observer to understand the measurement
as himself surviving as two diverging copies (of different weights) following the
measurement. (As Saunders (1998) has pointed out, this is closely analogous to
the cases of personal fission considered by Parfit (1984).)

(When is tempted to ask: What does it feel like while the split itself is oc-
ccurring? Hopefully it should be clear by now that this is a bad question: if
(as functionalism claims) statements about mental phenomena are statements
about the functional behaviour of the brain (i.e., about the dynamical patterns
in it) and if the timescales on which the functional processes occur are very
long compared to the decoherence timescale (which they are) then there can be
no awareness of the event of splitting at all — thus allowing us to justify Ev-
nett’s famous claim to this effect (Everett 1957, p. 460). By analogy, suppose
an artificial-intelligence program were to be run on a (classical) digital com-
puter; it would be meaningless to ask what it felt like for that program whilst
the computer was in the process of changing from one digital configuration to
another. Understanding that process requires us to abandon the language of
computer programs and descend to the level of electronics, and ‘mental’ talk
about the computer or program doesn’t engage with that level.)

The approach advocated here also alleviates (though does not solve entirely)
the problem of probability in the Everett approach. An observer about to
measure a superposed state knows that after the measurement there will exist
more than one functional structure which he will regard as the same individual

\textsuperscript{13}Note that my argument is rather different from that used by Chalmers (1996) to take
superposition into multiplicity. Chalmers proposes a principle (the ‘superposition principle’)
which effectively says that if conscious experience is present in one term of a superposition,
then it is present in the superposition; this was shown to be unworkable by Byrne and Hall
(1999). I make use only of the much weaker result (following from the functionalist criterion)
that a superposition of orthogonal states, each of which is determinately part of a sequence
of functional states, realises all the functional processes encoded by those sequences. This
in turn relies upon the existence of decoherence to give a preferred basis in which functional
sequences are possible; in this use of a preferred basis my approach is similar to that suggested
by Vaidman (2000) in his reply to Byrne and Hall.
as himself. He has no reason not to care about their futures just as he cares about ‘his own’ future, for even in the absence of splitting his future existence consists only in the future presence of patterns such as these. But the different future copies may have different interests which he could influence by actions prior to the measurement; so how are these different interests to be weighted? There is no a priori reason to weight them equally. Granted, we have not shown that the ‘correct’ or ‘most rational’ weighting is the standard one, but we have at least shown that it is rational for the observer to assign some weighting: in other words, we have shown that there is room for probabilistic concepts (at least the decision-theoretic sort) to be accommodated in the theory. This is already enough to bring the Everett interpretation onto the same level as any other physical theory, for — as pointed out in the quantum context by Papineau (1996) — we have no really satisfactory understanding of probability in any other context either! For more constructive attempts to justify the probability rules, though (from a wide variety of perspectives) see Deutsch (1999), Saunders (1998), Tappenden (2000), Vaidman (1998) and Zurek (1998).

It is worth remembering the crucial role that decoherence is playing in this account: without it, we would not have the sort of branching structure which allows the existence of effectively non-interacting multiple near-copies of a given process. As it is, though, we are able to identify many different functional structures realised in different parts of the universal state, each with the right sort of complexity to merit the title ‘observer’.

Would it be possible to reject functionalism — that is, reject the application of Dennett’s criterion to conscious observers — without having to reject this paper’s ‘structural’ approach to quantum theory? Not necessarily, for functionalism is neutral about how functional systems are to be realised physically, whereas in this structural approach to quantum theory there is space for us to require the system to be instantiated in a certain way — say, in the position basis (although see Wallace (2001b) for the difficulties of this particular basis choice). However, the structural approach is committed to an approach to the mind which

- denies observers some uniquely special status, but describes them as emergent as structures and patterns in lower-level physics (specifically, in lower-level classical physics, itself to emerge from unitary quantum physics via decoherence);
- is comfortable with some rough edges in the definition of which systems count as observers (for decoherence will never give us an exact macroworld).

Functionalism fits these criteria in a very natural way.

8 Conclusions

In his critique of many-worlds interpretations, Kent (1990) states that

[W]e have tried to clarify the logical structure of the MWI . . . The attempt may not have entirely succeeded. But we are convinced
that the procedure is justified, and in fact that axiomatization should have been insisted upon from the beginning. For any MWI worth the attention of physicists must surely be a physical theory reducible to a few definite laws, not a philosophical position irreducibly described by several pages of prose.

It is not the purpose of this paper to argue against this view of physical theories. I agree that physical theories should be axiomatizable, and in fact would say that the axioms of any worthwhile Everettian theory should be just those of ‘bare’ unitary quantum mechanics, without axioms of measurement or collapse.

However, when we are describing observations, or cats, or people, within physics, we inevitably need to make contact with higher-order theories — of material science, of cat biology, of psychology and neuroscience. This contact is not made by fiat, via abstractly or generally stated principles; rather, it occurs because those theories are emergent from the microphysics, describing patterns which occur within the microphysics. Indeed we do need several pages of somewhat philosophical prose to describe carefully how this emergence takes place — but the point is that having understood the process in the classical case, there really is no reason to think anything different is going on in quantum theory.

To summarise the view of quantum theory that then emerges:

- Macroscopic objects are to be understood as structures and patterns in the universal quantum state.
- Multiplicity occurs at the level of structure — thus macroscopic objects do not have indeterminate states after quantum measurements, but are genuinely multiplied in number.
- We can tolerate some small amount of imprecision in the macroworld: a slightly noisy pattern is still the same pattern. Hence we do not need to worry that decoherence does not give totally non-interfering branches, just very nearly non-interfering ones.
- There will be no precise answers to some questions (such as, ‘when did the splitting take place?’), just very accurate ones.
- Other questions (such as those concerning transtemporal identity, or identity between objects across branches) will not always have good answers at all, because they rely on concepts which though practically very useful, sometimes break down.

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And, it should be stressed, Kent certainly makes no such claim.
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