Norton, John D. (2002) On Thought Experiments: Is There More to the Argument? [Preprint]
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Abstract
Thought experiments in science are merely picturesque argumentation. I support this view in various ways, including the claim that it follows from the fact that thought experiments can err but can still be used reliably. The view is defended against alternatives proposed by my co-symposiasts.
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| Item Type: | Preprint |
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| Keywords: | thought experiment empiricism Platonism |
| Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Models and Idealization |
| Conferences and Volumes: | [2002] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 18th Biennial Mtg - PSA 2002: Contributed Papers (Milwaukee, WI; 2002) > PSA 2002 Symposia |
| Depositing User: | John Norton |
| Date Deposited: | 09 Aug 2002 |
| Last Modified: | 07 Oct 2010 11:10 |
| Item ID: | 719 |
| URI: | http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/719 |
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