Elliott, Kevin (2010) Direct and Indirect Roles for Values in Science. [Preprint]
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Abstract
Although many philosophers have employed the distinction between “direct” and “indirect” roles for values in science, I argue that it merits further clarification. The distinction can be formulated in several ways: as a logical point, as a distinction between epistemic attitudes, or as a clarification of different consequences associated with accepting scientific claims. Moreover, it can serve either as part of a normative ideal or as a tool for policing how values influence science. While various formulations of the distinction may (with further clarification) contribute to a normative ideal, they have limited effectiveness for regulating how values influence science.
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| Item Type: | Preprint |
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| Keywords: | values; inductive risk; value judgments; science and values; public policy |
| Subjects: | General Issues > Ethical Issues General Issues > Science and Society General Issues > Science Policy General Issues > Values In Science |
| Depositing User: | Kevin Elliott |
| Date Deposited: | 10 Dec 2010 23:30 |
| Last Modified: | 10 Dec 2010 23:30 |
| Item ID: | 8420 |
| URI: | http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/8420 |
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